Partial Suntan Timeline
Capt. Jay R. Brill, West Pointer, mechanical and nuclear engineer, would manage the logistics,
including the quantity production of liquid hydrogen and its storage,
transportation, and handling. The team worked initially at Wright Field and moved to ARDC headquarters in Baltimore in June, as a
special projects office.7
Considering the highly classified U-2 and the Air Force's
desire to build a superior airplane, it is not surprising that the new project
was very closely held. It was given a special classification higher than
"Top Secret," the highest standard category. Full access, was limited to about 25 people,
an extremely small number considering the size and complexity of the large
research and development effort.8
Two compelling
reasons beyond technical management and Air Force security called for a special
projects office: fast contractual action and contractor security. To get an airplane developed in the two or three years that Putt
demanded meant bypassing the normal, but time-consuming, management and
procurement processes. Appold turned to
Col. Lee Fulton, head of procurement at ARDC Headquarters and his deputy,
Robert Miedel, for help; Miedel served as temporary procurement officer. They
soon had a blanket "determination and findings" statement from
Richard Horner, assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and
development, and [144] directives
from the Air Force deputy chiefs of staff for development and materiel,
Putt and Irvine. These authorities allowed the Suntan team to waive normal
procurement procedures and award contracts directly, with a minimum of
review. This cut months from the procurement process.
Author's
Note
The
two to three year time line of course matches that of the A-11.
Fall of 1955
A brief investigation
was carried out by R. W. Bussard of the use of ducted nuclear continuous flight
partly because of rockets for the propulsion of high speed aircraft for in the
atmosphere. This work was never published; the relatively uninteresting
performance found for such a vehicle when used in competition with nuclear
powered ICBM’S, and partly because no thought was given to the aerospace plane
mission of current interest. Some results of this study are summarized in
Appendix A, from which we see that vehicle performance (for the fuel/propellant
assumed) drops markedly between M --4 and M ~ 5. This drop is a result of the
decrease in lift/drag ratio assumed in the study and the effect of increase in
ram air temperature with increasing flight speeds. With hydrogen
fuel this
performance decrease would take place at about M - 6 to M - 7, other
assumptions remaining the same.
Dec. 1955
Bussard, R. W.; 1955, Nuclear Rocket Reactors; A Six-Month
Study Review, LAMS-1983, Los Alamos Sci. Lab.,
February 1956
The initial project
planned by the Air Force at NRTS was the flight test runway. AEC entered into a
contract for the design of the flight test runway and related facilities. The
design work, essentially completed by August 1956, cost about $462,000.
Early 1956
Armed
with a proposal for a hydrogen-fueled supersonic airplane as a follow-on to the
U-2, he visited the Pentagon where he had no difficulty seeing high Air Force
officials, including Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, the deputy chief of staff for development.2 Johnson offered to build two prototype hydrogen-fueled
airplanes, with the first to fly within 18 months. They would fly at an
altitude of 30 300 meters, a speed of Mach 2.5, and have a range of 4070
kilometers.3 To the Air Force, which had missed the opportunity to buy
Johnson's original U-2 proposal, the offer was too tempting to resist; they
bought it.
18 January 1956
After
receiving the proposal, Putt called a meeting. Among those present were his counterpart
for materiel, Lt. Gen. Clarence S. Irvine; Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Power, head of
the Air Research and Development Command; and Col. Norman C. Appold, head of
Wright Air Development Center's power plant laboratory. The purpose of the
meeting was to evaluate Johnson's proposal, but in his opening remarks, Putt
made it clear that the Air Force wanted a new high-altitude airplane within two
or three years, whether or not it was the one that Johnson proposed.4
February 1956
The initial project
planned by the Air Force at NRTS was the flight test runway. AEC entered into a
contract for the design of the flight test runway and related facilities. The
design work, essentially completed by August 1956, cost about $462,000.
20 February 1956
Appold's first assignment was to select a qualified engine
manufacturer to study a hydrogen-fueled engine and if feasible, develop it.
Given a month to do this by Putt, Appold selected two candidates: the General
Electric Company and the Pratt &[143]
Whitney division of United Aircraft. He met with their representatives,* asked
for and received proposals within two weeks, evaluated them, and selected Pratt
& Whitney. He reported his actions at another meeting in Putt's office on
20 February, and the selection was approved.5
16 March 1956
Kelly
Johnson saw his task as much more than designing and building a hydrogen fueled
airplane. He was also concerned about its operation, for if it was to be
successful, liquid hydrogen had to be produced and shipped in quantity and be
handled like gasoline. On 16 March 1956, he and his staff met with
representatives of J.H. Pomeroy and Company of Los Angeles, a consulting
engineering firm. Johnson wanted Pomeroy to study the engineering feasibility
and cost of producing parahydrogen in quantity, and he was interested in three
production rates-45 000, 135 000, and 225 000 kilograms per day. He wanted the
plant location to be in the Antelope Valley of California. Pomeroy agreed to
undertake the study, and ten days later Johnson sent them a letter of intent
with ground rules.
Spring 1956
Suntan engine activities
at Pratt & Whitney were in full swing. Coar selected Richard C. Mulready, a
bright young engineer, as his assistant. Liquid hydrogen handling tests began
immediately with hydrogen obtained from the Cambridge Corporation in dewars.
Associated with this activity were preparations for component and engine
testing, including obtaining a supply of liquid hydrogen. With the help of
Capt. Jay Brill, a hydrogen liquefier of 227-kilogram-per-day capacity wits
purchased from Herrick L. Johnston and installed in the engine test area behind
the [153] East Hartford plant. The
test area was called the "Klondike" because of the cold Connecticut
winters and well-ventilated test stands that were designed to prevent the
accumulation of hydrogen. Coarand Mulready also began to round up all the
gaseous hydrogen tube trailers they could find to supply the liquefier.24
April 1956
The letter contract
AF 33(600)-32054 for Convair was converted into a definitive contract.
APRIL 1956
The second activity, code named "Shamrock," began
in April to convert a J-57 to burn hydrogen. The design was completed in May;
thereafter, component testing and engine modifications ran concurrently. The
hydrogen liquefier was ready in September, engine testing began in October. The
test engineers were agreeably surprised by the ease of engine operation. They
ran it at full power and throttled back so far that the air fan was revolving
so slowly the individual blades could be counted. Under this latter condition,
the throttle could be opened and the engine would quickly and smoothly
accelerate to full power. They found that the temperature distribution was good
and there were no major problems. Such satisfactory results came only after
careful design studies, modifications, and component testing. Among these
precursory activities were the development of a heat exchanger using air bled
from the compressor to gasify the hydrogen, modifications to the J-57
electronic fuel control system, and development of an oil-lubricated,
liquid-hydrogen pump. Figures 38 and 39 show
a schematic of the modified J-57 and comparison with the standard model.
01 MAY 1956
Contract negotiations with Pratt & Whitney started early
in April and by the first of May, a six-month contract had been signed.
Agreement was also reached with Lockheed. Officials of Pratt & Whitney,
impressed with the potential of hydrogen and wishing to avoid the red-tape of a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, agreed to a fixed cost contract. As it turned out,
their costs exceeded the fixed amount and Pratt & Whitney lost money** Lockheed
held out for a provisional contract that could be renegotiated and repriced at
the end of the contract. Both firms, however, were hard at work by the first of
April 1956. The contracts were made retroactive, to cover the fast start.6
mid-1956
P&W experienced
serious technical difficulties with the single reactor concept and terminated
the work and shifted to the twin reactor concept.
June 11,1956
Definitive design of
the filter system was started.
June 18, 1956
Shortly before the
architect-engineer completed the preliminary design of the FET facility, GE
recommended to AEC, that all filter work on the Initial Engine Test facility be
stopped.
August 1956
Construction of the
facilities, known as the Georgia Nuclear Laboratory, Air Force Plant No. 67
started
August 3, 1956
Definitive design
work had already been completed on the filter system.
August 8
AEC cancels Work on
the filter.
August 1956
Pratt & Whitney engineers had designed the new engine to
use hydrogen. It was designated the "304," taken from the division's
engine order number 703040, 16 April 1956.26 It
was essentially the one proposed earlier by Sens and Kuhrt and is shown
schematically by figure 40.
Liquid hydrogen was pumped at high pressure through a heat exchanger in the aft
section of the engine. The heated hydrogen drove a multistage turbine which,
through a reduction gear. powered a multistage air fan. The fan compressed
incoming air, the primary working fluid of the engine. Part of the hydrogen
discharged from the turbine was injected and burned in the air-stream behind
the fan. The amount of hydrogen injected and burned was controlled to limit the
temperature of the combustion gases which furnished the heat for the heat
exchanger downstream. The remaining hydrogen was injected and burned in the
after-burner section bevond the heat exchanger, and the hot gases and air
expanded through the nozzle to produce propulsive thrust. The engine was
similar to the Rex III but much simpler, as only one heat exchanger was used.
The maximum diameter of the 304 engine was 203 centimeters, as compared to the
150 centimeters proposed by Garrett for Rex III. Nacelle length was 10.7
meters, weight 2722 kilograms, thrust at 30 500 meters altitude, 21.4
kilonewtons (4800 lb). and specific fuel consumption 0.082 kilogram/ newton
hour (0.8 lb/ lb . hr). These are close to the specifications in Sens's draft
of 24 February 1956.
October 1956
P&W awarded a
purchase order for the development of specifications and procedures for
equipment to be used in the facilities.
November 1956
Lockheed issued a
purchase order for a Shield Development Reactor (SDR) for use at the Georgia
Nuclear Laboratory (GNL), Dawsonville, Georgia.
December 1956
The Weapon System
125-A program was canceled.
December 1956
The flight objectives
for the ANP program were canceled.
1957
Kelly
Johnson and F. A. Cleveland, wrote "After a half century of striving to
make aircraft carry reasonable loads farther and farther, the advent of a type
of power plant that will solve the range problem is of the utmost
importance." [33] Later, when referring again to the unlimited range they
wrote, "And this unique characteristic is one to be greeted
enthusiastically."[34] "when improved materials are available, we
would expect the nuclear power plant to advance rapidly in its overall
efficiency, with a consequent improvement in ability to install such power
plants in airplanes of smaller size than those currently contemplated."
Author's Note:
It is notable that Johnson gives this talk and publishes a paper on nuclear propulsion in step with end of the Suntan Program. It is also clear that a spaceplane was being built. The U.S. Military probably orbited the Earth before the Soviet Union.
Fall 1957
It is notable that Johnson gives this talk and publishes a paper on nuclear propulsion in step with end of the Suntan Program. It is also clear that a spaceplane was being built. The U.S. Military probably orbited the Earth before the Soviet Union.
Fall 1957
The
J-57 experiments demonstrated beyond question that a conventional turbojet
could be readily adapted to use hydrogen. Such engines could have been used to
meet Kelly Johnson's tight airplane development schedule, but modifying an
existing turbojet could not optimize the advantages of hydrogen. The Pratt
& Whitney engineers had realized this early in their studies, as had their
counterparts in the Rex division of Garrett and the Air Force. The mainline
Pratt & Whitney effort from the start focused on a design of a special
hydrogen engine, and its design started in April 1956 with the first contract.25
* Jack Parker, Gen. Mgr., Aircraft Gas Turbines Div., General
Electric Co., and Charles Dribble, a G.E. engineer; Wright Parkins, William
Gwinn, and Perry Pratt & Whitney.
** Pratt & Whitney received $15.3 million for the first phase of
work and spent $17.1 million. Interview, Ernest Schweibert with Lt. Richard
Doll. Dec. 1958.
*** Of numerous stories of security incidents, one of the most
interesting involved a good-looking female engineer of the Skunk Works who
almost-and inadvertently-blew Suntan's cover. She attended a symposium on
hydrogen at the NBS Cryogenics Laboratory and following established practice of
the Skunk Works, registered as representing herself. Standing nearby was a male
engineer who knew she worked for Lockheed but had forgotten her name. He peeked
at the register and immediately grew suspicious, wondering why Lockheed was
interested in hydrogen and hiding it. Interview awith Col. Gardner, 19 Sept.
1973.
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