THE THREAT MADE ON "ANGEL" AIR FORCE ONE

 (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: White House Receives Phone Call in Which Caller Threatens Air Force OneEdit event  

Eric Edelman.

Eric Edelman. [Source: US Department of Defense]

An anonymous phone call is received at the White House in which the caller says Air Force One, the president’s plane, will be the next terrorist target and uses code words indicating they have inside information about government procedures. [CHENEY, 9/11/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 18] Air Force One is currently flying toward Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, with President Bush on board (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 325] The White House receives a call from an anonymous individual, warning that the next target of the terrorist attacks will be Air Force One. The caller refers to the plane as “Angel.” [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 106-107; WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 18; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 554; DARLING, 2010, PP. 60-61] “Angel” is the Secret Service’s code name for Air Force One. [WILLIAMS, 2004, PP. 81; CBS NEWS, 11/25/2009] An unnamed “high White House official” will later say the use of “American code words” shows the caller has “knowledge of procedures that made the threat credible.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001]

Government Officials Told about Threat - News of the threatening call is promptly passed on to government officials in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC)—a bunker below the White House—and reported on the Pentagon’s air threat conference call. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/11/2001 pdf file; NEWSWEEK, 12/30/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 554; DARLING, 2010, PP. 60-61] Vice President Dick Cheney, who is in the PEOC, will comment that the news “reinforced the notion here… that the government has been targeted and that we need to be extra careful about making certain we protected the continuity of government, secured the president, secured the presidency.” [WHITE HOUSE, 11/19/2001] According to Major Robert Darling of the White House Military Office, who is also in the PEOC, “The talk among the principals in the room quickly determined that the use of a code word implied that the threat to Air Force One and the president could well be from someone with access to [the president’s] inner circle—possibly someone who was near the president at that very moment.” [DARLING, 2010, PP. 61]

Accounts Conflict over Who Receives Call - It is unclear who at the White House answers the call in which the threat against Air Force One is made. The call is received by the White House switchboard, according to some accounts. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 106; FLEISCHER, 2005, PP. 141-142] Other accounts will indicate it is received by the White House Situation Room. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 554; DARLING, 2010, PP. 60-61] Eric Edelman, a member of Cheney’s staff who is in the PEOC, will say the call is received by the Secret Service. [WHITE HOUSE, 10/25/2001] But two Secret Service agents who are on duty today will deny “that their agency played any role in receiving or passing on a threat to the presidential jet,” according to the Wall Street Journal. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 pdf file] However, a Secret Service pager message will be sent at 10:32 a.m., which states that the “JOC”—the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House—has received an “anonymous call” reporting that “Angel is [a] target.” [CBS NEWS, 11/25/2009]

Military Officer Passes on Details of Threat - Officials in the PEOC reportedly learn about the threat to Air Force One from a military officer working in the center. Although Cheney will say the threat “came through the Secret Service,” he will say later this year that he is unsure who passed the details of it to those in the PEOC. [MEET THE PRESS, 9/16/2001; WHITE HOUSE, 11/19/2001] An official in Cheney’s office will say in 2004 that Cheney was informed of the threat by “a uniformed military person” manning the PEOC, although Cheney and his staff are unaware who that individual was. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 pdf file] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will say that those in the PEOC are told about the threat by a “communicator,” meaning one of the military officers who works in the PEOC, and is responsible for “establishing phone lines and video lines, and staying in touch with the National Military Command Center” at the Pentagon. [WHITE HOUSE, 11/1/2001] The military officer Rice is referring to may be Darling. Darling will recall that he answers a call from the White House Situation Room about the threat to Air Force One and then passes on the information he receives to Rice, telling her, “Ma’am, the [Situation Room] reports that they have a credible source in the Sarasota, Florida, area that claims Angel is the next target.” Rice immediately passes on the news to Cheney, according to Darling. [DARLING, 2010, PP. 60-61] Cheney will subsequently call Bush and tell him about the threat (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 106-107; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002]

Reason for 'Bogus' Threat Unclear - The threat will be determined to be “almost surely bogus,” according to Newsweek. [NEWSWEEK, 12/30/2001] The Secret Service’s intelligence division tracked down the origin of this threat,” the 9/11 Commission Report will state, “and, during the day, determined that it had originated in a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the White House Situation Room.” Although the 9/11 Commission will say it found the intelligence division’s “witnesses on this point to be credible,” Deborah Loewer, the director of the White House Situation Room, will dispute this account. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 554] By the end of 2001, White House officials will say they still do not know where the threat came from. [NEWSWEEK, 12/30/2001] Darling will write in 2010, “To this day, it has never been determined why either the ‘credible source’ or Situation Room personnel used that code word [i.e. ‘Angel’] in their report to the PEOC.” [DARLING, 2010, PP. 62] “The best we can tell,” Rice will say, is that “there was a call that talked about events—something happening to the president on the ground in Florida. And that somehow got interpreted as Air Force One.” She will say that the fact the caller knew the code name for Air Force One is “why we still continue to suspect it wasn’t a crank call.” [WHITE HOUSE, 11/1/2001] However, former Secret Service officials will say the code name wasn’t an official secret, but instead “a radio shorthand designation that had been made public well before 2001.” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Eric Edelman, Condoleezza Rice, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Deborah Loewer, US Secret Service, Robert J. Darling, White House

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Holloway's Commentary

Air Force One was threatened and electronically attacked on 911. 

Air Force One Communications Jammed

 (9:54 a.m.-2:50 p.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Has Problems Communicating with Washington while He Is on Air Force OneEdit event  

President Bush on the phone during the flight from Sarasota to Barksdale Air Force Base.

President Bush on the phone during the flight from Sarasota to Barksdale Air Force Base. [Source: White House]

President Bush and his staff have difficulty communicating with colleagues in Washington, DC, while they are traveling on Air Force One, after the plane takes off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTHWEST INDIANA TIMES, 9/22/2002; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006; POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016] Bush had problems calling his colleagues at the White House while he was being driven to the airport, after leaving the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, at around 9:35 a.m. (see (9:34 a.m.-9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006]

Air Force One Should Have 'Outstanding Communications' - He ought to have more success after he boards Air Force One, at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001), since the plane has state-of-the-art communications systems. [INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE, 9/1998; HARDESTY, 2003, PP. 167] Its capabilities are “just as good as the communications from the Oval Office in terms of [the president] being able to call, in a secure way, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the generals that might have to fight a war, or the vice president or… the national security adviser,” White House chief of staff Andrew Card will later comment. The plane has the “capacity to have… outstanding communications,” he will say. [WHITE HOUSE, 8/12/2002]

Communications Systems Are 'All Jammed' - However, Bush and his staff have great difficulty sending and receiving information about the day’s events while they are on Air Force One. [NORTHWEST INDIANA TIMES, 9/22/2002] The “multiple [communications] systems—commercial and terrestrial systems” on the plane are “all jammed,” according to Master Sergeant Dana Lark, superintendent of communications. Lark actually wonders, “Did someone sabotage our comms?” [POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016]

Bush Has Problems Communicating with Vice President Cheney - Bush finds that his calls are successful only intermittently. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Attempts are made to establish an open line with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who are at the White House, but the line keeps dropping. [BUSH, 2010, PP. 131] “It was absolutely stunning, standing next to the president as he was talking to the vice president, then holding the phone off his ear because it cut off,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer will comment. [POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016] At one point, Bush pounds his desk in frustration and shouts: “This is inexcusable. Get me the vice president.” [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002] He also has difficulty reaching his wife, Laura, since the line keeps dropping when he tries to call her. He eventually talks to her shortly before 11:45 a.m., when Air Force One is approaching Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana (see (Shortly Before 11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BUSH, 2010, PP. 132]

Officials in Washington Are Unable to Call the Plane - Some key individuals in Washington are unsuccessful when they try calling Air Force One. Scott Heyer, a communications officer in the White House Situation Room, is unable to contact the plane while it is flying from Sarasota to Barksdale Air Force Base, even when he tries calling its satellite phone (see 9:54 a.m.-11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/16/2004] And White House counselor Karen Hughes is unable to reach the president when she tries calling him while he is airborne (see (Between 10:31 a.m. and 11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; NBC, 4/4/2004]

Bush Has His First Teleconference Hours after Leaving Sarasota - As a result of his problems communicating from the plane, Bush will hold his first teleconference with his principal advisers at around 3:15 p.m. (see (3:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001)—more than five hours after he takes off from Sarasota—after he arrives at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, where there is sophisticated communications equipment (see 2:50 p.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTHWEST INDIANA TIMES, 9/22/2002; BUSINESS WEEK, 11/4/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 326] By that time, the communication problems will apparently have started to ease. Lark will recall that as Air Force One is flying to Offutt, “some of the commercial systems finally began to become available” and she actually receives a call from her chief. [POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016]

Good Communications Are 'Critical' for the President - Bush’s communication problems may have a significant impact on the government’s ability to respond to the terrorist attacks. Thomas Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, will explain why the president’s ability to communicate during a crisis is so important, saying, “In the case of any kind of attack in the United States, what you’re supposed to do is get the president off the ground and Air Force One then becomes the command center.” Once he is airborne, the president is “commanding the forces of the United States from the air,” Kean will say. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] “The president literally can’t function in his constitutional role unless he can communicate, so [good communications are] absolutely critical,” Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Herman, a senior presidential communications officer, will similarly comment. [MARIST MAGAZINE, 10/2002] The president “is the only one who can give certain orders that need to be given,” Kean will note. [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] However, Mark Rosenker, director of the White House Military Office, will claim that the communication problems have only a limited impact. “[F]or the most part I believe the president had the ability to do what was necessary to be in control and have command of his forces, and talk with his national security structure,” he will say. [WHITE HOUSE, 8/29/2002]

Communications Systems Are Supposedly 'Saturated' - Lark will learn at a later date that the communication problems occur because, she will say, “the commercial systems were all just saturated.” [POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016] Rosenker will similarly suggest that the problems may be partly due to the fact that communications from Air Force One “have to get through a regular telephone network,” and when there is a crisis, the increased volume of communications “jam and overuse the structure.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/29/2002] On top of their problems making and receiving calls, Bush and his staffers have difficulty monitoring the television coverage of the attacks while they are airborne, because the reception on the plane is poor and intermittent (see (9:54 a.m.-6:54 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002; NORTHWEST INDIANA TIMES, 9/22/2002; POLITICO MAGAZINE, 9/9/2016]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Condoleezza Rice, Ari Fleischer, Thomas Herman, Scott Heyer, Andrew Card, Mark Rosenker, Dana Lark, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Laura Bush, Karen Hughes

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

UFO SIGHTINGS INCREASED WITH ANP GOALS

1952
A modified direct nuclear powered Canberra was responsible for the 1501 UFO sightings. 

1957

The indirect nuclear powered U2 is responsible for 1006 UFO sightings. 

1966

The nuclear powered ramjet engined SR-71 is responsible for 1112 UFO sightings. 

NOTES:

The U-2 made its first flight in August 1955, with famed Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier, at the controls, and began operational service in 1956.

Members of a unit innocuously designated 2nd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional), began to arrive at Adana Air Base in Turkey in August 1956.

https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/u-2.htm#:~:text=The%20U%2D2%20made%20its,in%20Turkey%20in%20August%201956.

The SR-71’s first flight took place on Dec. 22, 1964, and the first operational aircraft entered service with the 4200th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force Base, California, in January 1966.

A total of 32 aircraft were built.

https://airman.dodlive.mil/2017/07/10/airframe-the-sr-71-blackbird/#:~:text=The%20SR%2D71's%20first%20flight,of%2032%20aircraft%20were%20built.