Q: What is the main internal threat? And what is the main external threat? And could you designate the internal threat by a term and the external threat by naming a specific state?
A: If you are talking about internal threats there are several. They include economic security, terrorism, crime, information security that the concept addresses for the first time. And speaking about external threats everybody is interested in just one thing, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.
I recently gave a detailed briefing on the concept to the diplomatic corps, 57 ambassadors were present. And the questions revolved around this. So, regarding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons I would like to say one thing: Russia has never said and does not say now that it will be the first to use nuclear weapons. But at the same time, Russia does not say that it won't use nuclear weapons if it becomes exposed to a full-scale aggression that threatens the breakup and the very existence of Russia.
This is to put it in a nutshell. On the other hand, the whole of our military doctrine, the state of the army and the way it is equipped send out a clear message to everyone that Russia is not an aggressor and is not going to be an aggressor. In other words, the doctrine is fairly peace-loving. And when I said that it won't be the first to use nuclear weapons but it doesn't mean that it will never use nuclear weapons -- this is the dialectics of deterrence.
TESTIMONY March 21, 2000 GEORGE J. TENET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
We are also worried about the security of Russian WMD materials, increased cooperation among rogue states, more effective efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities, and growing interest by terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities. Our efforts to halt proliferation are complicated by the fact that most WMD programs are based on dual-use technologies and materials that have civil as well as military applications.
Biological and chemical weapons pose, arguably, the most daunting challenge for intelligence collectors and analysts. Conveying to you an understanding of the work we do to combat this threat is best dealt with in closed session, but there are some observations and trends that I can highlight in this unclassified setting. - First, the preparation and effective use of biological weapons (BW) by both potentially hostile states and by non-state actors, including terrorists, is harder than some popular literature seems to suggest. That said, potential adversaries are pursuing such programs, and the threat that the United States and our allies face is growing in breadth and sophistication. -
Second, we are trying to get ahead of those challenges by increasing the resources devoted to biological and chemical weapons and by forging new partnerships with experts outside the national security community. - Third, many of our efforts may not have substantial impact on our intelligence capabilities for months or even years. There are, and there will remain, significant gaps in our knowledge. As I have said before, there is continued and growing risk of surprise.
About a dozen states, including several hostile to Western democracies-Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria-now either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical capabilities for use against their perceived enemies, whether internal or external. Some countries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and see biological and chemical weapons as a viable means to counter overwhelming US conventional military superiority.
Fortunately, despite press reports claiming numerous instances of nuclear materials trafficking, we have no evidence that any fissile materials have actually been acquired by a terrorist organization. We also have no indication of state-sponsored attempts to arm terrorist organizations with the capability to use any type of nuclear materials in a terrorist attack. That said, there is a high risk that some such transfers could escape detection and we must remain vigilant. Similarly, we have no evidence that large, organized crime groups with established structures and international connections are-as yet-involved in the smuggling of nuclear materials.
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