Friday 13 August 2021

8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: Last Radio Contact with Flight 77





The timing of the "hijacking" coincides with the move to higher altitude. This is when the fuselage was depressurized killing all onboard. Flight 77 was electronically hijacked. It changed course to the Pentagon. The plane then went into a steep dive pushing the plane past Mach 1 and using GPS guidance the whole fuselage was stuffed into a window taking out the NOC and DIA Offices.   


8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: Last Radio Contact with Flight 77

The last radio contact with Flight 77 is made when a pilot asks for clearance to fly higher. However, six minutes later, the plane fails to respond to a routine instruction. Presumably, it is hijacked during that time. Indianapolis flight control center is handling the plane by this time. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8]


Entity Tags: Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


8:51 a.m.-8:54 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijackers Take Over Flight 77Edit event  

Charles Burlingame.

Charles Burlingame. [Source: Family photo / Associated Press]

The 9/11 Commission says the hijacking of Flight 77 takes place between 8:51 a.m., when the plane transmits its last routine radio communication (see 8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001), and 8:54 a.m., when it deviates from its assigned course (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Based on phone calls made from the plane by flight attendant Renee May (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and passenger Barbara Olson (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the commission concludes that the hijackers “initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives and box cutters… and moved all of the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft.” It adds, “Neither of the firsthand accounts to come from Flight 77… mentioned any actual use of violence (e.g., stabbings) or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8-9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 29] People who knew Charles Burlingame, the pilot of Flight 77, will later contend that it would have required a difficult struggle for the hijackers to gain control of the plane from him. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2002] Burlingame was a military man who’d flown Navy jets for eight years, served several tours at the Navy’s elite Top Gun school, and been in the Naval Reserve for 17 years. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/6/2001] His sister, Debra Burlingame, says, “This was a guy that’s been through SERE [Survival Evasion Resistance Escape] school in the Navy and had very tough psychological and physical preparation.” [JOURNAL NEWS (WESTCHESTER), 12/30/2003] Admiral Timothy Keating, who was a classmate of Burlingame’s from the Navy and a flight school friend, says, “I was in a plebe summer boxing match with Chick, and he pounded me.… Chick was really tough, and the terrorists had to perform some inhumane act to get him out of that cockpit, I guarantee you.” [CNN, 5/16/2006] Yet the five alleged hijackers do not appear to have been the kinds of people that would be a particularly dangerous opponent. Pilot Hani Hanjour was skinny and barely over 5 feet tall. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/15/2001] And according to the 9/11 Commission, the “so-called muscle hijackers actually were not physically imposing,” with the majority of them being between 5 feet 5 and 5 feet 7 in height, “and slender in build.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004] Senator John Warner (R-VA) later says “the examination of his remains… indicated Captain Burlingame was in a struggle and died before the crash, doing his best to save lives on the aircraft and on the ground.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/8/2001]


Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, John W. Warner, Charles Burlingame


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Possibly Knows Flight 77 Is Hijacked, yet NEADS Not NotifiedEdit event  

An article in the New York Times will later suggest that officials in the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) promptly become aware of the problems with Flight 77, long before NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is alerted to the flight. The article will state, “During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 [is] under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in [the NMCC are] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001] This appears consistent with what would be expected under normal procedures. According to the FAA’s acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger: “Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident.” He will say that, since the FAA does not have direct dedicated communication links with NORAD, in a hijack scenario the NMCC has “the responsibility to coordinate [the Defense Department]‘s response to requests from the FAA or the FBI.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] NEADS reportedly is not alerted to Flight 77 until significantly later: at 9:24 a.m. by some accounts (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), or, according to other accounts, at 9:34 a.m., when it only learns that Flight 77 is missing (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]


Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, National Military Command Center, Monte Belger


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon


(8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Veers Off CourseEdit event  

Flight 77 from Washington begins to go off course over southern Ohio, turning to the southwest. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Passenger Possibly Leaves Voicemail Messages at Her Husband’s Old Law FirmEdit event  

Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, possibly calls the law firm her husband, Solicitor General Ted Olson, used to work for and leaves messages on his voicemail there. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/13/2001] Barbara Olson calls Ted Olson at his office at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC, two times this morning and, in the calls, says her plane has been hijacked and gives details of the hijacking (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] It is possible that she also tries leaving information about the hijacking for her husband by calling his number at the firm he worked for before becoming solicitor general. An FBI document will later state that on September 13, two days after he was interviewed by the FBI about his wife’s calls from Flight 77, Ted Olson talked over the phone with the FBI and “advised he had new messages on his voicemail at his old law firm.” During the conversation, the document will state, he said that “his old secretary would provide access to these calls to the FBI.” The document will make no mention of the contents of the voicemail messages or state the times at which they were recorded. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/13/2001] Olson’s old law firm is Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Before taking over as solicitor general in June this year, Olson worked in the firm’s Washington office. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 6/24/2004] There will be no mention of any calls to Ted Olson’s old law firm in a list supposedly showing all of the calls made from Flight 77 today that the Department of Justice will provide to the 9/11 Commission. The list will include four “connected calls to unknown numbers,” which, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, include the two calls Barbara Olson made to Ted Olson at his office at the Department of Justice. The FBI and the Department of Justice will in fact determine that all four calls were communications between Barbara Olson and her husband’s office. The 9/11 Commission will note, though, that there is no “direct evidence” showing this. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455]


Entity Tags: Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Barbara Olson


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77’s Transponder Signal Disappears, yet NEADS Is Not AlertedEdit event  

Flight 77’s transponder is turned off, meaning that the aircraft’s speed, altitude, and flight information are no longer visible on radar displays at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The Indianapolis Center air traffic controller in charge of Flight 77 watched the plane go off course and head southwest before its data disappeared from his radar screen. He looks for primary radar signals along the aircraft’s projected flight path as well as in the airspace where it had started to turn, but cannot find it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] He tries contacting the plane repeatedly, saying “American 77, Indy,” and: “American 77, Indy, radio check. How do you read?” But there is no response. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001]

NEADS Not Contacted - US News and World Report will later comment, “[E]xperts say that an airliner making a 180-degree turn followed by a transponder turnoff should have been a red flag to controllers.” It will quote Robert Cauble, a 20-year veteran of Navy air traffic control, who says: “The fact that the transponder went off, they should have picked up on that immediately. Everyone should have been on alert about what was going on.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10/8/2001] Yet the Indianapolis Center supposedly does not notify NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS will only learn that Flight 77 is missing at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27]

Controller Thinks Plane Suffered Mechanical Failure - While several air traffic control centers were reportedly informed of the Flight 11 hijacking as early as 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), according to the 9/11 Commission, the controller handling Flight 77 does not realize other aircraft have been hijacked, and he is unaware of the situation in New York. He mistakenly assumes Flight 77 has experienced an electrical or mechanical failure. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] After he informs other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation, they will clear all other aircraft from the plane’s westerly route so their safety will not be affected if Flight 77 is still flying along its original path but unable to be heard. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 29; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30]

Airline and Possibly Pentagon Learn of Flight 77 Problems - While NEADS is not alerted about the errant aircraft, a controller at the Indianapolis Center will contact American Airlines at 8:58 to inform it that contact has been lost with Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30] And an article in the New York Times will indicate that the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) promptly becomes aware of the problems with Flight 77 (see (Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001]


Entity Tags: Robert Cauble, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Disappears from Indianapolis Center Radar ScreensEdit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked [Flight 77] from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56 [a.m.].” However, for eight minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar data is not displayed to Indianapolis Center air traffic controllers. “The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, Flight 77 “was hijacked in an area of limited radar coverage.” The Post adds that there are two particular types of radar system. “Secondary” radar “is the type used almost exclusively today in air traffic control. It takes an aircraft’s identification, destination, speed, and altitude from the plane’s transponder and displays it on a controller’s radar screen.” “Primary” radar, on the other hand, “is an older system. It bounces a beam off an aircraft and tells a controller only that a plane is aloft—but does not display its type or altitude. The two systems are usually mounted on the same tower.” Normally, “If a plane simply disappears from radar screens, most controllers can quickly switch on the primary system, which should display a small plus sign at the plane’s location, even if the aircraft’s transponder is not working. But the radar installation near Parkersburg, W. Va., was built with only secondary radar—called ‘beacon-only’ radar. That left the controller monitoring Flight 77 at the Indianapolis Center blind when the hijackers apparently switched off the aircraft’s transponder (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), sources said.” [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In its final report, the 9/11 Commission will include a rather elaborate explanation for the loss of primary radar contact with Flight 77, saying it is because “the ‘preferred’ radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the ‘supplemental’ radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC [air traffic control] software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the ‘tertiary’ and ‘quadrary’ radars.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460] The Commission will note that two managers at the Indianapolis Center who assist in the search on radar for the missing aircraft do “not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]


Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Informs American Airlines of Loss of Contact with Flight 77Edit event  

An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center contacts the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas, and informs it that contact has been lost with Flight 77. The controller is a sector radar associate, whose job is to help with hand-offs and to coordinate with other sectors and facilities. He speaks to American Airlines dispatcher Jim McDonnell. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63] The controller begins, “This is Indianapolis Center trying to get a hold of American 77.” McDonnell asks for clarification, “Who you trying to get a hold of?” and the controller replies: “American 77.… On frequency 120.27.… We were talking to him and all of a sudden it just, uh…” McDonnell interjects: “Okay, all right. We’ll get a hold of him for you.” The call comes to an abrupt end and the controller then continues trying to contact Flight 77. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63-64] Soon after this call, American Airlines’ executive vice president of operations, Gerard Arpey, will give an order to stop all American flight takeoffs in the Northeast US (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). By 8:59 a.m., American Airlines begins attempts to contact Flight 77 using ACARS (a digital communications system used primarily for aircraft-to-airline messages). Within minutes, some time between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m., American will get word that United Airlines also has lost contact with a missing airliner (presumably Flight 175). When reports of the second WTC crash come through after 9:03 a.m., one manager will mistakenly shout, “How did 77 get to New York and we didn’t know it?” [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 454; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31] The sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center will call American Airlines again about Flight 77 at 9:02, and again speak with McDonnell (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001]


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim McDonnell


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Orders No New Takeoffs in USEdit event  

American Airlines orders all its aircraft in the Northeast United States that have not yet taken off to remain on the ground, and then, minutes later, extends this order nationwide. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31] At the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, managers have learned that communications have been lost with a second one of their aircraft, Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Therefore, at around 9:00, Gerard Arpey, the airline’s executive vice president for operations, orders a “ground stop” of all American Airlines and American Eagle flights in the Northeast US. This means aircraft that have not yet taken off must remain on the ground. Minutes later, American learns that United Airlines has lost contact with one of its flights. So, some time between 9:05 and 9:10, it extends its ground stop order to apply to all American Airlines and American Eagle aircraft across the entire US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9-10] United Airlines will also prevent any further takeoffs of its flights at 9:20 (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] And the FAA will give out a similar order to all its facilities, initiating a “national ground stop,” at around 9:25 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001] At around 9:15, American Airlines will order all its airborne flights to land (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31]


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Gerard Arpey


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secretary in Solicitor General Olson’s Office Receives a Series of Calls that Fail to Go ThroughEdit event  

Lori Keyton, a secretary in the office of Solicitor General Ted Olson at the Department of Justice, receives a number of unsuccessful calls, which presumably are made by Barbara Olson, the wife of the solicitor general, who is a passenger on Flight 77. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94] Flight 77 was hijacked between around 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see 8:51 a.m.-8:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8] At about 9:00 a.m., Keyton receives a series of around six to eight collect calls. Her phone has no caller identification feature, so the caller is unknown. All of the calls are automated and, in them, a recorded voice advises of the collect call and requests that Keyton hold for an operator. A short time later, another recording states that all operators are busy and so the person should please hang up and try their call later. After the last of these automated calls occurs, Keyton will answer a call from a live operator, connecting Barbara Olson to her husband’s office (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She will answer a second call from Barbara Olson that is made directly to the office a few minutes later (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Keyton will immediately put Barbara Olson through to her husband after answering both of these calls. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94] A list compiled by the Department of Justice supposedly showing all of the calls made today from Flight 77 will apparently make no mention of the failed calls that Keyton answers. It will mention four calls from an unknown number, which are believed to include the two successful calls made by Barbara Olson. It will also include one call—not six to eight—that is described as being made by Barbara Olson to Ted Olson’s office, which failed to connect, but this is made just before 9:19 a.m. rather than around 9:00 a.m., when the failed calls received by Keyton reportedly occur (see 9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455]


Entity Tags: Barbara Olson, Lori Lynn Keyton


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Alerted to Crisis, Immediately Activates Interagency GroupEdit event  

Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is at a conference three blocks from the White House when a telephone call alerts him to the crisis. He runs to his car. He responds, “Activate the CSG on secure video. I’ll be there in less than five.” The CSG is the Counterterrorism Security Group, comprising the leaders of the government’s counterterrorism and security agencies. Clarke hurriedly drives to the White House. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 1]


Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Counterterrorism and Security Group


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Richard Clarke


(After 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Flight Control Issues Alert to Look for Flight 77; FAA and NORAD Not NotifiedEdit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, shortly after 9:00 a.m., Indianapolis flight control begins to notify other government agencies that American 77 is missing and has possibly crashed. For instance, at 9:08 a.m., Indianapolis contacts Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and tells them to look out for a downed aircraft. It is not clear what Air Force Search and Rescue does with this information. Indianapolis also contacts the West Virginia State Police at about 9:15 a.m., and asks whether they have any reports of a downed aircraft (see Soon After 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, they apparently do not contact NORAD, but do notify the FAA regional center at 9:09 a.m. (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]


Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, 9/11 Commission, Langley Air Force Base, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Controller Calls American Airlines Second Time, Says Flight 77 Location UnknownEdit event  

An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center contacts the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas, and informs dispatcher Jim McDonnell that the center is unable to make contact with Flight 77 and does not know the location of this aircraft. The same controller called American Airlines and spoke with McDonnell four minutes earlier, reporting that radio contact had been lost with Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). McDonnell now says he has tried contacting Flight 77 but did not get a reply back. The controller then tells him: “We, uh, we lost track control of the guy. He’s in coast track but we haven’t, we don’t [know] where his target is and we can’t get a hold of him. Um, you guys tried him and no response?” McDonnell confirms, “No response.” The controller continues: “Yeah, we have no radar contact and, uh, no communications with him. So if you guys could try again.” McDonnell replies, “We’re doing it.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30] Flight 77 made its last radio communication with controllers at 8:51 (see 8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001), and deviated from its assigned course at 8:54 (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8-9]


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim McDonnell


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower; Millions Watch Live on TelevisionEdit event  

Flight 175 hits the WTC South Tower. The picture was taken from a traffic helicopter.

Flight 175 hits the WTC South Tower. The picture was taken from a traffic helicopter. [Source: WABC 7/ Salient Stills]

Flight 175 hits the South Tower of the World Trade Center (Tower Two). Seismic records pinpoint the time at six seconds before 9:03 a.m. (rounded to 9:03 a.m.). Hijackers Marwan Alshehhi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mohand Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alghamdi presumably are killed instantly, and many more in the tower will die over the next few hours. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 1-10; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/26/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; USA TODAY, 9/2/2002] According to the NIST report, the crash time is 9:02:59. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 38] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the crash time is 9:03:11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8] Millions watch the crash live on television. The plane strikes the 77th through 85th floors in the 110-story building. Approximately 100 people are killed or injured in the initial impact; 600 people in the tower eventually die. The death toll is far lower than in the North Tower because about two-thirds of the South Tower’s occupants have evacuated the building in the 17 minutes since the first tower was struck. [USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 5-9, 41] The combined death toll from the two towers is estimated at 2,819, not including the hijackers. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] The impact severs some columns on the south side of the South Tower. Each of the Twin Towers is designed as a “tube-in-tube” structure and the steel columns which support its weight are arranged around the perimeter and in the core. The plane, which is traveling at an estimated speed of around 500 mph (see October 2002-October 2005), severs 33 of the building’s 236 perimeter columns and damages another one. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 39] The perimeter columns bear about half of the tower’s weight, so the damage to them reduces the tower’s ability to bear gravity loads by about 7.1 percent. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 6] The actual damage to the 47 core columns is not known, as there are no photographs or videos of it, but there will be much speculation about this after 9/11. It will be suggested that some parts of the aircraft may be able to damage the core even after crashing through the exterior wall (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 107] According to NIST’s base case model, five of the core columns are severed and another five suffer some damage. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 235 pdf file] This may reduce the tower’s ability to bear loads by a further approximately 8 percent, meaning that the aircraft impact accounted for a loss of about 15 percent of the building’s strength. This damage will be cited as an event contributing to the building’s collapse after 9/11 (see October 23, 2002 and October 19, 2004). NIST’s base case estimate of damage to the North Tower’s core will be similar, even though the aircraft impact there was dissimilar (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). Flight 11 hit the North Tower’s core head on, whereas Flight 175 only hits the corner of the South Tower’s core. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 20-23, 38-41] In addition, some of the fireproofing on the steel columns and trusses may be dislodged (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXVI, 83 pdf file] Photographs and videos of the towers will not show the state of fireproofing inside the buildings, but the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will try to estimate the damage to fireproofing using a series of computer models. Its severe case model (see (October 2002-October 2005)) will predict that 39 of the 47 core columns are stripped of their fireproofing on one or more floors and that fireproofing is stripped from trusses covering 80,000 ft2 of floor area, the equivalent of about two floors. NIST will say that the loss of fireproofing is a major cause of the collapse (see April 5, 2005), but only performs 15 tests on fireproofing samples (see October 26, 2005). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 41] According to NIST, less fireproofing is stripped from the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Marwan Alshehhi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Hamza Alghamdi, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Ahmed Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 175, Flight UA 93, George Bush, World Trade Center, Marwan Alshehhi, Other 9/11 Hijackers, WTC Investigation


(Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Officers at FAA Command Center Contact NMCC about Response to AttacksEdit event  

Two officers in the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC)—a small office at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, manned by military reservists—contact the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, to ask about military assistance in response to the terrorist attacks. [US AIR FORCE, 9/11/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 4/14/2004]

Military Leaders 'in a Meeting to Determine Their Response' - Apparently shortly after the south World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03 a.m., Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the Command Center, asks the ATSC for a military response to the ongoing events (see 9:06 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). Therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, one of the three officers on duty in the ATSC, calls the NMCC. However, according to a chronology of the ATSC’s actions on this day, Cherry is told that “senior leaders” at the NMCC are “in a meeting to determine their response” to the attacks, and will call back.

Second Officer Calls NMCC, Told Fighters Have Been Launched - Then, at around 9:08 a.m., Sliney talks to another of the officers on duty in the ATSC, Colonel John Czabaranek, and asks if fighter jets have been launched toward New York. [US AIR FORCE, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 4/14/2004] Two F-15s have already taken off from Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, toward the New York area (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), but, according to the 9/11 Commission, “Lacking a target,” these fighters have been “vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast” (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] In response to Sliney’s inquiry, Czabaranek calls the NMCC. The NMCC indicates that it is aware of the request for fighter support, and says aircraft have been scrambled from Otis Air Base. Czabaranek passes this information on to Sliney, telling him that fighters are en route.

ATSC's Secure Phones Initially Not Working - According to the chronology of the ATSC’s actions, the unit’s secure phones do not work for an incoming call from the NMCC that is apparently made shortly after 9:03 a.m. The ATSC’s keys for its secure phones are recalibrated, and the phones then “worked fine.” [US AIR FORCE, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 4/14/2004]


Entity Tags: Air Traffic Services Cell, John Czabaranek, Ben Sliney, Michael-Anne Cherry, National Military Command Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Air Base Commanders Assemble, Make Transition to ‘Wartime Posture’Edit event  

Commanders at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, begin taking decisive action following the second attack on the World Trade Center. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153-154] The commanders learned of the attacks in New York from watching the coverage on television. After the second WTC tower was hit, one of them had ordered the base’s battle staff to assemble (see (8:56 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 87-88]

Commanders Gather in Operations Center - The commanders now convene in the base’s operations building. As officers take their posts, the installation operations center (IOC) there comes to life. In the glass-enclosed battle cab that is at the core of the IOC, senior commanders gather around a large conference table, which overlooks the two main operations centers: these are the command post, from where the air war is coordinated, and the survival recovery center, which handles support functions such as security, food, and medical care.

Commanders Take Pre-Emptive Action - Senior commanders confer with intelligence officers who are with them in the battle cab, over what to do in response to the crisis. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Worcester, the logistics group commander of the 102nd Fighter Wing, which is based at Otis, says, “We need to start doing some things preemptively.” Author Lynn Spencer will describe: “The Otis commanders decided to ‘lean forward’ in anticipation of what they might be called upon to do. But there has never been an air attack on America, and there is no protocol in place to tell them how to respond. They knew intuitively that they could not wait on guidance from the higher echelons of NORAD. This attack could easily expand, and they needed to be prepared.” The senior commanders quickly establish their agenda, which is to recall all the base’s training flights, and begin loading fuel and weapons onto all available fighter jets. According to Spencer, “The officers smoothly undertook the task of transitioning to a wartime posture.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153-154] A number of jets that are out on a training mission will be recalled to the base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 155]


Entity Tags: Paul Worcester, Otis Air National Guard Base


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(Between 9:03 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines and FAA Command Center Again Discuss Loss of Flight 77Edit event  

American Airlines and the FAA Command Center discuss the hijacking of Flight 77 again, apparently at some point between when Flight 175 hits the World Trade Center at 9:03 (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Flight 77 hits the Pentagon at 9:37 (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Although American Airlines was initially informed of the hijacking by the FAA (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001), at this point an American Airlines employee calls an FAA employee and tells him that Flight 77 has been hijacked. The FAA employee appears to be unaware of this hijacking, as, when he is told that American Airlines is missing a second plane (in addition to Flight 11, which has hit the World Trade Center) he asks for the flight number and inquires when the company last knew something about the flight. The American Airlines employee responds by saying, “we were talking to them according to Indianapolis Center about 45 minutes ago.” As the last recorded communication with Flight 77 was as at 8:51 (see 8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001), this would put this conversation at around 9:36. However, this conversation is part of a transcript of discussions by FAA employees and others, and in the transcript it appears shortly after the first mention of Flight 175’s crash at 9:03, indicating it may have occurred earlier than 9:36. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/14/2003, PP. 19-21 pdf file]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Atlantic City Fighters Recalled from Runway to be Armed, but Do Not Launch until after Pentagon AttackEdit event  

Mike Cosby.

Mike Cosby. [Source: US Department of Defense]

Two fighter jets at a New Jersey military unit that are about to launch for training are recalled to respond to the attacks in New York, but will not be airborne until after the Pentagon is hit. The two F-16s belong to the 177th Fighter Wing, located at Atlantic City International Airport, and are only loaded with BDUs (practice bombs) for their routine training mission. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002] Colonel James Haye, the supervisor of flying (SOF) at the 177th FW, was informed of the first aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, and then went to a nearby television to see the footage of the burning North Tower. He’d alerted Lt. Col. Randall King, one of the base’s pilots, who was in the same room as him. King, who is an experienced commercial pilot, said: “Whoever was at the controls did that on purpose. That is no accidental crash! And that was no small airplane!” After watching the television coverage for several minutes, Haye sets about putting the scheduled training mission on hold. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 58-59 AND 120] As they are taxiing to the runway, the two fighters preparing to launch are told to stop and return to the flight line (the parking and servicing area for aircraft). Personnel at the base then set about removing the training munitions and arming the planes with live missiles. Major Tom Cleary, one of the pilots, will later recall, “We launched almost immediately after the Pentagon was hit.” However, apparently his aircraft will not be properly armed. He recalls, “I was still carrying training munitions, but I had live guns.” Col. Mike Cosby, the commander of the 177th FW, indicates the jets may not launch until slightly later, saying, “We were airborne within the hour after the Pentagon attack.” Later on, four F-16s with live missiles will be launched from the unit, followed by another four, also with live missiles. According to Cosby, “We were the first non-alert unit to fly armed ordnance over the Northeast corridor anywhere the Northeast Sector of NORAD wanted us to fly, between New York City and Washington, DC.” [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002] Two F-16s with the 177th FW have been airborne already this morning, practicing bombing runs near Atlantic City, and are called back to base following the attacks on the WTC to be re-fitted with live missiles and then re-launched (see 8:46 a.m.-9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003]


Entity Tags: Mike Cosby, James Haye, 177th Fighter Wing, Randall King, Tom Cleary


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Officers Realize US Is under Attack, Yet No Fighters Are LaunchedEdit event  

Pilots and officers with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, realize the US is under terrorist attack when they learn of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, yet the first DCANG fighter to launch in response to the attacks will not take off until more than 90 minutes later. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122-123]

Intel Officer Reports Crash - The 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which includes the 121st Fighter Squadron, is based at Andrews. [DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 8/21/2005] Some of its pilots and officers who are in the unit’s weekly scheduling meeting at the base learned of the first crash when an intelligence officer interrupted their meeting to bring them the news, but they assumed it was an accident (see Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). After the second plane hits the WTC at 9:03 a.m., the intelligence officer returns. He bursts into the room, yelling: “It’s happened again! The second tower has been hit! And it’s on purpose!” [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 pdf file; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122]

Officers Realize This Is a 'Coordinated Attack' - Those in the meeting realize this is a terrorist attack. Captain Brandon Rasmussen, a pilot who is also the chief of scheduling with the unit, will later recall: “At that point [the] meeting adjourned, this is no longer a pure accident, somebody is meaning to do this. I think everybody knew that this was a coordinated attack that was happening. We had no idea who it was by, but it was definitely intentional when you get two airplanes hitting both towers.” The officers head down the hall to the break room, where the television is on. Seeing the coverage from New York, they realize that large airliners hit the towers, not “light civil aircraft” as they previously thought.

People 'Launched into Action' - One officer exclaims, “Well, holy sh_t, if this is a terrorist attack, we need to get something in the air!” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 123] Lieutenant Colonel Steve Chase, who is at the operations desk, will later describe: “People just launched into action. There was a buzz in the unit. People got on the radio and telephones to higher headquarters.” [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002]

Leadership Only Acts after Pentagon Attack - However, Rasmussen will say that the 121st Fighter Squadron only takes proper action in response to the attacks after the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. He will recall that, after learning of the second attack, “we didn’t know what we could possibly do, that’s New York City way up the road. So… like everybody else in America, we’re just standing by and watching the news. Time dilatation between the towers being hit and when the Pentagon was hit, but the news [broke] about the Pentagon being hit, and by that time they were in our backyard. At that point, the squadron leadership went into action.… As soon as the Pentagon was hit, we knew that we were going to be sticking around home and being quite busy.” [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003] Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, will only head across the base to assist the response at the 121st Fighter Squadron’s headquarters after the Pentagon attack occurs (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445-446]

Jets Take Off over 90 Minutes Later - According to Knight Ridder, “Air defense around Washington, DC, is provided mainly by fighter planes from Andrews.” [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/11/2001] Yet the first DCANG fighter jet to take off in response to the attacks does not launch until 95 minutes after the second crash, at 10:38 a.m. (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and this has no missiles, only training ammunition. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44] The first fully armed jets will take off from Andrews at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 84; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004]


Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Steve Chase, Brandon Rasmussen


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: CIA Counterterrorist Center Learns of at Least One More Plane Unaccounted forEdit event  

According to CIA Director George Tenet, “Only minutes” after the South Tower is hit, the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) receives a report that at least one other commercial passenger jet plane is unaccounted for. [TENET, 2007, PP. 163] The CTC is based at the CIA headquarters in Langley, and is run by the agency’s operations division. It gathers intelligence and runs covert operations abroad. It employs hundreds of analysts, and includes experts assigned from Defense Department intelligence agencies, the Pentagon’s Central Command, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other government agencies. According to the Los Angeles Times, “It serves as the nerve center for the CIA’s effort to disrupt and deter terrorist groups and their state sponsors.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/2/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/12/2001] Further details of the unaccounted-for plane, and where the CTC learns of it from, are unclear. The plane is presumably Flight 77, which veered off course at 8:54 (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and was evidently lost by 8:56 (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The FAA will later claim it had established several phone bridges at around 8:50 a.m., which included various government agencies, on which it shared “real-time information… about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] So the CTC may have learned of the errant plane by this means. Yet the 9/11 Commission will claim the FAA’s phone bridges were not established until about 9:20 (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] And NORAD is supposedly only alerted to Flight 77 at 9:24, according to some accounts (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), or 9:34, according to others (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Learns of Additional Suspicious Planes, but Vice President’s Agents Supposedly Not AlertedEdit event  

Nelson Garabito.

Nelson Garabito. [Source: CNN]

A senior Secret Service agent at the White House establishes a direct phone line with his counterpart at the FAA and is told there are more suspect planes that are unaccounted for, but this information supposedly does not lead to the evacuation of the vice president from his White House office.

Secret Service Liaison Calls FAA - Secret Service agent Nelson Garabito, who is responsible for coordinating the president’s movements and is also the agency’s liaison to the FAA, is at the Secret Service Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the White House, attending a 9:00 a.m. meeting. After seeing the second attack on the World Trade Center on television, he calls Terry Van Steenbergen, his counterpart at the FAA. According to Garabito, the TV’s sound is off, so it takes a few minutes before he realizes a second plane has hit the WTC and makes the call. But Van Steenbergen, who is at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, will say Garabito calls him “within 30 seconds” of the attack.

Warning Not Passed On - Shortly into the call, Van Steenbergen tells Garabito there are two unaccounted for planes that are possibly hijacked, in addition to the two that have crashed into the WTC. Garabito tells someone with him to run upstairs and pass this information on to other Secret Service agents, but, according to the 9/11 Commission, “it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated.” As a result, Van Steenbergen’s information “failed to reach agents assigned to the vice president, and the vice president was not evacuated at that time.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003, PP. 9-11; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/30/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 464]

Conflicting Evacuation Times - According to the 9/11 Commission, the Secret Service does not evacuate Vice President Dick Cheney from his office at the White House until “just before 9:36.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 39] However, some accounts will say Cheney is evacuated around the time of the second attack on the WTC (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would suggest that Van Steenbergen’s information is indeed passed on and disseminated. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] Garabito and Van Steenbergen will remain in contact over the phone—via a direct line, not a conference call—for the next 14 hours. Garabito feeds information to Van Steenbergen, though Van Steenbergen does not know how Garabito is getting this information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/30/2004]


Entity Tags: US Secret Service, Nelson Garabito, Terry Van Steenbergen, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


Between 9:03 a.m. and 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Official at Pentagon Says, ‘We’re Next’Edit event  

After the second WTC tower is hit, NBC News correspondent Jim Miklaszewski is heading down a hall inside the Pentagon when he runs into a Defense Department official. The official says he doesn’t yet know anything specific about the attack. But, he says, it is so coordinated that “[i]f I were you I would stay off the E-ring [the outermost corridor of the Pentagon] today, because we’re next.” According to Miklaszewski, the official had no specific information, “that was just his gut instinct.” [GILBERT ET AL., 2002, PP. 43]


Entity Tags: Jim Miklaszewski


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Pentagon


(After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Base Commanders Offer to Help NORAD; Timing of Acceptance UnclearEdit event  

Amraam missiles being loaded onto a 119th Fighter Wing jet at an unknown time on the day of 9/11. The 119th is based at Langley Air Force Base, Virgnina.

Amraam missiles being loaded onto a 119th Fighter Wing jet at an unknown time on the day of 9/11. The 119th is based at Langley Air Force Base, Virgnina. [Source: William Quinn]

Shortly after the second World Trade Center crash, calls from fighter units begin “pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’” From Syracuse, New York, a commander of the 174th Fighter Wing of the New York Air National Guard calls and tells Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS): “Give me 10 [minutes] and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 [minutes] and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” Marr replies, “I want it all.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; NEWS 10 NOW, 9/12/2006] Reportedly, Marr says: “Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] Canadian Major General Rick Findley, based in Colorado and in charge of NORAD on this day, reportedly has his staff immediately order as many fighters in the air as possible. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/11/2002] However, according to another account, NEADS does not accept the offers until about an hour later. The Toledo Blade will report, “By 10:01 a.m., the command center began calling several bases across the country for help.” [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that an order for other bases to prepare fighters to scramble is not given until 9:49 a.m. In fact, it appears the first fighters from other bases to take off are those from Syracuse at 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). This is over an hour and a half after Syracuse’s initial offer to help, and not long after a general ban on all flights, including military ones, is lifted at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). These are apparently the fourth set of fighters scrambled from the ground. Previously, three fighters from Langley Air Force Base, two from Otis Air National Guard Base, and two from Toledo, Ohio, were scrambled at 10:01 a.m. (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001), but did not launch until 15 minutes later. [TOLEDO BLADE, 12/9/2001]


Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Eric A. “Rick” Findley, 174th Fighter Wing, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Operations Center Receives Many False Reports of HijackingsEdit event  

William Glover.

William Glover. [Source: Thomas Doscher / US Air Force]

The NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, receives numerous reports from the FAA of additional hijacked aircraft, but most of these reports turn out to be incorrect. Lieutenant Colonel William Glover, the commander of NORAD’s Air Warning Center, will later recall that after 9:03 a.m., when the second plane hits the World Trade Center, those in the operations center are “starting to receive reports… that we have these hijackings coming in.” He will say, “We had all these other reports coming in now, we were receiving from FAA, that there’s other issues on there.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/8/2011] According to Glover, the FAA says to NORAD, “Hey, this may be a possible hijack, or this aircraft may be a possible hijack.” As a result, those in the operations center “did not know how many more there were. Were there five, six, seven, or eight?” [BBC, 9/1/2002] Major General Rick Findley, NORAD’s director of operations, will similarly recall: “Lots of other reports were starting to come in. And now you’re not too sure. If they’re that clever to coordinate that kind of attack, what else is taking place across North America?” [TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001] According to Glover, the uncertainty about how many additional hijacked planes there are will lead NORAD to implement a limited version of a plan called SCATANA, which clears the skies and gives the military control of US airspace (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, most of the additional hijackings that the FAA is reporting to NORAD turn out to be false alarms. Glover will say that most of the reports “were not true.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/8/2011] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, there are “multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft” during the morning (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28]


Entity Tags: Eric A. “Rick” Findley, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Federal Aviation Administration, William Glover


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:04 a.m.-9:11 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Control Managers Ban Aircraft around New York and WashingtonEdit event  

In a series of stages, air traffic control managers ban aircraft from flying near the cities targeted by the hijackers. All takeoffs and landings in New York City are halted within two minutes of the Flight 175 crash (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). Mike McCormick, the air traffic control manager at the FAA’s New York Center, makes the decision. The FAA’s Boston Center follows suit in the next few minutes. Around 9:08 a.m.-9:11 a.m., departures nationwide heading to or through the New York and Boston regions’ airspace are canceled. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002; USA TODAY, 8/12/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002] In addition, “a few minutes” after 9:03 a.m., all takeoffs from Washington Reagan National Airport are stopped. [USA TODAY, 8/11/2002]


Entity Tags: Mike McCormick, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York and Washington Center Controllers Told to Watch for Suspicious AircraftEdit event  

After the second World Trade Center crash at 9:03 a.m., air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center are told by their supervisors to watch for airplanes whose speed indicates that they are jets, but which either are not responding to commands or have disabled their transponders. Controllers in Washington receive a similar briefing, which will help them pick out hijacked planes more quickly. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Whether controllers at other FAA air traffic control centers receive similar instructions at this time is unclear, but those at its Indianapolis Center, which is handling Flight 77, are apparently not informed by their supervisors of the unfolding crisis. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 105-107]


Entity Tags: Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77


Soon After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Director of Air Traffic Services Joins FAA TeleconferenceEdit event  

Bill Peacock, the FAA director of air traffic services, is currently away from FAA headquarters for a meeting in New Orleans (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). His staff called him earlier to alert him to the possible hijacking of Flight 11. He returned to his hotel room in time to see the second attack live on CNN. He quickly phones FAA headquarters, trying to contact his staff, and has his call added to the teleconference being run from the conference room next to his office. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 12 AND 22] According to a statement provided by the FAA to the 9/11 Commission in 2003, this teleconference began “[w]ithin minutes” of the first WTC tower being hit (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 9/11 Commission will later claim that it was not established until “about 9:20” (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which is about 15 minutes later than Peacock supposedly joined it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Peacock


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Space Closed over New York AreaEdit event  

Bruce Barrett.

Bruce Barrett. [Source: H. Darr Beiser / USA Today]

The FAA’s New York Center declares “air traffic control zero” (“ATC zero”), which means that all air traffic is prevented from departing from, arriving at, or traveling through the center’s airspace until further notice. [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002; FRENI, 2003, PP. 18; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24] According to author Lynn Spencer: “ATC zero is designed for situations in which an air traffic facility is completely incapable of handling aircraft due to a massive computer failure, power outage, or even a large enough weather system. The declaration pushes all their aircraft onto neighboring sectors, and any new airplanes from adjacent sectors are turned back, at the sector boundaries if necessary.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 68] The decision to declare ATC zero is made after the second plane hits the World Trade Center, confirming that the US is under terrorist attack. There are currently hundreds of aircraft in the skies around New York and the western Atlantic that the New York Center is responsible for. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002] Bruce Barrett, a senior manager at the New York Center, announces, “We’re declaring ATC zero,” and Mike McCormick, the center’s air traffic control manager, approves the order. Several of the managers there then start informing air traffic controllers of the decision.

Unprecedented Order - USA Today will report that this decision is unprecedented: “Controllers had gone to ‘air traffic control zero’ before, but only when their radar shut down or their radio transmitters went silent. The planes kept flying then, and controllers in other centers guided them. This time, ATC zero means something far more drastic. It means emptying the skies—something that has never been attempted. And not just the skies over Manhattan. Controllers must clear the air from southern New England to Maryland, from Long Island to central Pennsylvania—every mile of the region they control.… Controllers from Cleveland to Corpus Christi must reroute jets headed to the region and put some in holding patterns.”

Accounts Conflict over Whether Center Seeks Permission - According to USA Today, McCormick and Barrett declare ATC zero without first seeking permission from higher-ups, because a “call to Washington could take minutes, and they aren’t sure they have that long.” [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] But according to Lynn Spencer, a New York Center supervisor has already requested ATC zero in a call to the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. Ben Sliney, the Command Center’s national operations manager, assured the supervisor, “You take care of matters in your center and we will provide all the assistance necessary by stopping any further aircraft from entering your airspace.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 68]


Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Lynn Spencer, Bruce Barrett, Mike McCormick


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(Shortly After 9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Notifies FAA that It Wants Fighters Launched; Message Relayed to Air Force Base near WashingtonEdit event  

Andrews Air Traffic Control Tower.

Andrews Air Traffic Control Tower. [Source: FAA]

The Secret Service tells FAA headquarters that it wants fighter jets launched over Washington, DC, and this message is then relayed to the air traffic control tower at Andrews Air Force Base, which is 10 miles from Washington. The District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews is notified, but no jets will take off from the base until 10:38 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/28/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44, 465] The request for fighter jets is apparently made by Secret Service agent Nelson Garabito, who is responsible for coordinating the president’s movements, during a phone call with his counterpart at FAA headquarters in Washington, Terry Van Steenbergen. This call began shortly after the second tower was hit at 9:03 a.m. (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/30/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 464]

FAA Headquarters Calls Andrews Tower - According to the 9/11 Commission, “The FAA tower” at Andrews is then “contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters” who are “on an open line with senior agents from the president’s detail,” and is informed that the Secret Service wants fighters airborne. Karen Pontius at FAA headquarters tells Steve Marra, an air traffic controller at the Andrews control tower, “to launch F-16s to cap the airspace over Washington.”

Message Passed to DCANG - Marra then relays Pontius’s message to the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465] Marra apparently passes the message to Major Daniel Caine, the 113th Wing’s supervisor of flying, when Caine phones the control tower (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Caine will later recall that the tower controller (i.e. Marra) tells him “that they just received the scramble order.” But Caine will also tell the 9/11 Commission that the Andrews tower “would not have been in the loop for any Secret Service orders to scramble aircraft.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 76; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 pdf file] Despite receiving this message from the Secret Service, the DCANG will not launch its first fighter jet until 10:38 a.m. (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 44]


Entity Tags: Daniel Caine, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, Steve Marra, Terry Van Steenbergen, Nelson Garabito, US Secret Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Karen Pontius


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Begins ‘Lockout’ of Flight 77 InformationEdit event  

American Airlines initiates the “lockout” procedure to protect information about Flight 77. This standard procedure acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates information about it, so the airline’s top leadership can manage the case. A lockout safeguards information against being altered or released, and protects the identities of the plane’s passengers and crew. FAA air traffic controllers first alerted American Airlines about their loss of contact with Flight 77 at 8:58 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), and called the airline again about the flight at 9:02 (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 AND 30]


Entity Tags: American Airlines


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:05 am (and After) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Reappears on Radar, but Flight Controllers Do Not NoticeEdit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, Flight 77’s radar blip, missing for the last eight minutes, reappears on Indianapolis flight control’s primary radar scope. It is east of its last known position. It remains in air space managed by Indianapolis until 9:10 a.m., and then passes into Washington air space. Two managers and one flight controller continue to look west and southwest for the flight, but don’t look east. Managers don’t instruct other Indianapolis controllers to join the search for the flight. Neither they nor FAA headquarters issues an “all points bulletin” to surrounding centers to search for Flight 77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Newsday claims that rumors circulate the plane might have exploded in midair. [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] However, the 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that Indianapolis flight controllers did not look east is contradicted by an account indicating that American Airlines headquarters was told that Flight 77 had turned around.


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:06 a.m. and After September 11, 2001: FAA Manager Ben Sliney Responds to Second Crash, Declares New York ‘Ground Stop’Edit event  

At the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, national operations manager Ben Sliney responds to the second plane hitting the World Trade Center and orders a “first-tier ground stop” to prevent aircraft from departing, arriving at, or flying through the airspace of the FAA’s New York Center. Like many others at the Command Center, Sliney has just seen Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the WTC live on CNN. A manager at the center then reports to him the news just received over the Command Center’s teleconference, about the sinister radio transmissions that have been deciphered by the Boston Center, stating “We have some planes” (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to author Lynn Spencer, “The words take on a sickening significance” to Sliney “after what he has just observed.”

Sliney Orders 'First-Tier Ground Stop' - Sliney orders across the room, “Give me a first-tier ground stop!” According to Spencer, “The order stops all aircraft departing, arriving, or flying through New York Center’s airspace, effectively closing down the nation’s busiest skies.” At 9:06 a.m., an advisory is sent out to every air traffic control facility in the nation, and the skies above New York are now officially closed. Numerous flights that are in the air or preparing to take off are given “holding instructions.” Meanwhile, the large screen at the front of the room in the Command Center displays the footage of Flight 175 hitting the WTC as it is shown repeatedly on CNN. According to Spencer: “[I]t becomes sickeningly obvious to all watching that the plane was a large commercial airliner. And it was no accident.” [AOPA PILOT, 11/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 80-81] Around this same time, the FAA’s New York Center takes action similar to that of the Command Center, declaring “air traffic control zero,” which prevents all air traffic from departing, arriving at, or traveling through its airspace (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24] And at around 9:25 a.m., the Command Center will order a “nationwide ground stop,” which prevents any aircraft from taking off in the entire United States (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33]

Sliney Expands Teleconference - Also in response to the second WTC crash, Sliney decides that he needs to expand the Command Center’s teleconference (see (Between 8:48 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) so as to include the secretary of transportation. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 81] It is expanded to include the secretary of transportation’s office, FAA headquarters, and other agencies. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001] It is unclear whether Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta participates himself, as he is told to go to the White House around this time, and subsequently heads there (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003]

Military Liaison Unable to Help - Sliney also seeks out the military liaison at the Command Center to get more information about what is going on. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 81] Presumably this officer is one of the three members of the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) there (see (Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/10/2002] But, according to Spencer, it is “clear that the lieutenant colonel’s job has nothing to do with NORAD or the air defense interceptors. He is military, but his job duties at the Command Center are focused on military airspace usage. He has no place in the military chain of command that is relevant this morning.” Sliney therefore “can only assume that people much higher up than both of them are dealing with the military response. The fighters must be on their way.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 81]


Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, Norman Mineta, Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Services Cell


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Informs All Air Traffic Facilities of First HijackingEdit event  

According to a book about the Federal Aviation Administration’s response on 9/11, the FAA Command Center sends a message to all the nation’s air traffic facilities at this time, announcing the first hijacking. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 59] This would be two minutes after it had been informed that the Flight 11 hijackers had announced, “we have [some] planes” (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis Center, which handles Flight 77, only learns that there are other hijacked aircraft “By 9:20” (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23-24]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


Shortly After 9:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Instructed to Secure Washington AirspaceEdit event  

The air traffic control tower at Reagan National Airport.

The air traffic control tower at Reagan National Airport. [Source: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority]

Air traffic controllers at Washington’s Reagan National Airport are instructed to start securing the airspace around Washington, DC. In the tower at Reagan Airport, the controllers heard about the two aircraft hitting the World Trade Center. They then received the ground stop order for all flights going to or through New York. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145] (This order was issued at 9:06 a.m.—see 9:06 a.m. and After September 11, 2001. [AOPA PILOT, 11/2001] ) Shortly afterwards, they receive the instruction to start securing the airspace around the capital. They are told to turn away all non-airliner aircraft, such as private planes, as these are considered high risk. Who it is that issues this instruction is unstated, but presumably, like the New York airspace ground stop, it comes from the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 145]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:07 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Manager Wants Cockpit Security Warnings Sent to AircraftEdit event  

After conferring with the FAA’s New England regional office and contacting representatives of the Air Transport Association, the FAA’s Boston Center decides to issue a Notice to Airmen, warning pilots to heighten cockpit security. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24-25] Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the Boston Center, is concerned that there may be additional attacks. He therefore asks a manager at the FAA’s New England regional office if warnings could be sent to airborne aircraft via “ACARS or something,” advising them to increase their cockpit security. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24] (ACARS is an e-mail system that allows personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9] ) Biggio is particularly concerned about the need to warn airborne international flights that are scheduled to arrive at New York’s JFK International Airport. On the advice of a New England Region representative, Boston Center decides to contact Air Transport Association representatives through the FAA’s Herndon Command Center and ask them to formally request that airlines warn their aircraft to heighten cockpit security. According to the 9/11 Commission, though, Biggio is “[n]ot content to rely on the airlines to warn their aircraft,” and so decides that the Boston Center will issue a Notice to Airmen (“NOTAM”) to heighten cockpit security in light of the attacks in New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24-25] The NOTAM system is the communication method used to define the rules of the day for air traffic controllers and pilots. With the status of equipment, airports, and rules changing frequently, the NOTAM system is used to distribute any changes to all pilots and controllers. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 86] Two or three minutes later, controllers at the Boston Center will contact all the aircraft in their airspace by radio and advise them to increase cockpit security (see 9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25]


Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Terry Biggio, Air Transport Association


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Thinks Flight 77 Hit the WTCEdit event  

By this time, officials at American Airlines’ System Operations Control in Fort Worth, Texas have mistakenly concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30] American Airlines learned that communications had been lost with Flight 77 just before 9 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: American Airlines


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:08 a.m.-9:11 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Autopilot Briefly DisengagedEdit event  

After leveling off at 25,000 feet and making a slight course change to the east-northeast, Flight 77 has its autopilot disconnected. It remains off for about three minutes before being re-engaged. This is according to information later obtained from its flight data recorder. During these three minutes, Flight 77’s altitude dips as low as 22,000 feet, but by the time the autopilot is re-engaged it has leveled again at 25,250 feet. [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/13/2002, PP. 3 pdf file; NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002, PP. 2 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 AND 94] The autopilot will later be disengaged again for the last eight minutes of the plane’s flight (see 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Langley Fighters to Battle StationsEdit event  

In response to learning of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) orders the two F-16 fighter jets kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to battle stations. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 AND 88; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112] Being at “battle stations” means the plane’s pilots are in the cockpits but with the engines turned off. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55]

Nasypany Wants to Scramble Jets - At NEADS, mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany is concerned that the two F-15s launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 are running out of fuel (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and has asked Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, to scramble the two F-16s kept on alert at Langley, so as to establish a greater presence over New York. But after conferring with Major General Larry Arnold, who is at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, Marr orders “battle stations only at Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112]

Jets Put on Battle Stations - Marr and Arnold will tell the 9/11 Commission that the Langley jets are held on battle stations, rather than being scrambled, “because they might be called upon to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25] Marr will also say that, after Flight 175 hit the WTC at 9:03 a.m., those at NEADS are “thinking New York City is under attack,” so the Langley pilots are ordered to battle stations, as “[t]he plan was to protect New York City.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 60] Colonel Alan Scott, who is with Arnold at the CONR headquarters, will explain, “At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what’s going on.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Although the 9/11 Commission and other accounts will state that the Langley jets are put on battle stations at 9:09 (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001), a BBC documentary will place this at 9:21, and journalist and author Jere Longman will indicate this does not happen until 9:24. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24]


Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany, Langley Air Force Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold, Alan Scott


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controllers Give Cockpit Security Alert to All Their AircraftEdit event  

Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, instructs the air traffic controllers at his center to contact all aircraft in the center’s airspace by radio and inform them of the events taking place in New York. He tells the controllers to also advise the aircraft to heighten their cockpit security in light of these events. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25] According to author Lynn Spencer, previously “No transmission of that kind has ever been made on air traffic control frequencies.” Controller Jim Ekins is the first to act. He announces over all the radio frequencies in the sector: “All aircraft! Due to recent events that have unfolded in the Boston sector, you are advised to increase cockpit security. Allow no entry to your cockpit!” According to Spencer, other controllers nearby overhear and realize: “Yes! That’s exactly what we need to tell them!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 98] The Boston Center air traffic controllers then immediately execute Biggio’s order, and give the warning to their aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25] However, Spencer will write: “Communications with controllers are [usually] as dry as they come, and to many pilots this announcement is so out of their realm of understanding, training, and experience that it simply doesn’t make sense. It actually agitates some, who cannot help but view it as some new kind of ‘FAA bureaucratic bullsh_t.’” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 99] Boston Center will subsequently ask the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide, but the Command Center apparently will not act on this request (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] United Airlines will issue a company-wide order at 9:21 for its dispatchers to warn their flights to secure their cockpits (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455]


Entity Tags: Terry Biggio, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim Ekins


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pilots at Langley Air Force Base Go to ‘Battle Stations’Edit event  

Major Dean Eckmann.

Major Dean Eckmann. [Source: US Air Force]

The two pilots on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia are put on “battle stations,” and get into their fighter jets, ready to take off if required. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Being at “battle stations” means the pilots are in their planes’ cockpits with the engines turned off, but ready to start them and taxi out should a scramble order follow. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) has ordered this in response to the news of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center and over concerns that the fighters launched from Otis Air National Guard base in response to Flight 11 might run out of fuel (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 88] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, the two “alert” pilots at Langley are currently “still in the dark about the gravity of the moment.” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64-65]

Pilot Wonders If Order Connected to Events in New York - Major Dean Eckmann, one of the pilots on alert, will later recall: “The scramble horn goes off and we get the yellow light, which is our battle stations. So at that point I go running out to… my assigned alert airplane, get suited up, and I get into the cockpit ready to start.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He asks his crew chief, “Do you think this has anything to do with New York?” The chief replies: “I can’t imagine how. The Otis guys could handle that.”

Pilot Told 'This Is Just Precautionary' - Meanwhile, Captain Craig Borgstrom, the unit’s operations manager, is briefing the other alert pilot, Major Brad Derrig, on what he knows. He tells him: “There’s some wacky stuff happening. Some airplane just hit the World Trade Center. I don’t have any more information, but I’m sure this is just precautionary.” Borgstrom then heads out to give Eckmann the same brief, but has to stop to answer a phone call from NEADS (see (Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118] Although the 9/11 Commission and other accounts will state that the Langley jets are placed on battle stations at 9:09, a BBC documentary will suggest this happens at 9:21, and Longman will indicate this does not occur until 9:24. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] The two alert jets, along with a third jet piloted by Borgstrom, will be ordered to scramble at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16]


Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom, Langley Air Force Base, Dean Eckmann, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Brad Derrig


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighter Jets Running Out of FuelEdit event  

Because the two fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 expended a large amount of fuel as they flew toward the New York area (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), there are now concerns about getting them refueled. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] The fighters are currently flying a “holding pattern” in “Whiskey 105,” which is military training airspace just south of Long Island, over the Atlantic Ocean (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, reports to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that the two fighters have only 30 minutes of fuel remaining. At NEADS, Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, orders, “Find me a tanker!” Weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick quickly calls McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey to see if it has any of its KC-10 tankers airborne, but none are. Nasypany gets on the phone to Colonel Robert Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, and requests launching the two F-16s kept on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, so as to provide backup for the Otis fighters. Marr then discusses this over the phone with Major General Larry Arnold who is at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, but neither thinks it is a good idea. According to author Lynn Spencer: “If the battle expands, they don’t want to have all their assets in one place. Nor can they have them running out of fuel at the same time.” Marr and Arnold agree that they will try to find fuel for the Otis fighters. The Langley jets are ordered to “battle stations only” (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001) so they will be ready to launch if a refueling tanker cannot be found. Marr tells Nasypany that he will need to find fuel for the Otis fighters. NEADS technicians then begin searching for a tanker. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 460; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112-113] A member of staff at NEADS talked over the radio with a KC-135 tanker plane from Bangor, Maine, at around 9:05 a.m., and the plane’s crew agreed to provide support to the Otis fighters (see 9:04 a.m.-9:06 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001] But, according to Spencer’s account, NEADS is apparently unable to find a tanker to refuel the fighters until around 9:35 a.m., when one of the Otis pilots remembers that the KC-135 from Bangor should be available and in his area, and informs the other Otis pilot, who calls NEADS about this (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 152-153]


Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Steve Hedrick, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Timothy Duffy, McGuire Air Force Base, Langley Air Force Base, Kevin Nasypany, Larry Arnold


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Controllers Learn of Flight 11 Hijacking and WTC Crashes, yet Do Not Suspect Flight 77 Is HijackedEdit event  

An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), learns for the first time that there has been at least one hijacking—of Flight 11—this morning, and that planes have crashed into the World Trade Center. Yet, after he passes this information on to a colleague, neither controller suspects that the missing Flight 77 might also be hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 105-107]

Dispatcher Gives Details of Crisis - The controller, a sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center, calls the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas and overhears dispatcher Jim McDonnell on another call, discussing the morning’s crisis. He hears McDonnell saying, “… and it was a Boston-LA flight and [Flight] 77 is a Dulles-LA flight and, uh, we’ve had an unconfirmed report a second airplane just flew into the World Trade Center.” McDonnell then acknowledges the Indianapolis Center controller, who asks, “Did you get a hold of American 77 by chance?” McDonnell answers, “No sir, but we have an unconfirmed report the second airplane hit the World Trade Center and exploded.” The controller asks, “Say again?” McDonnell tells him: “You know, we lost American 11 to a hijacking. American 11 was a Boston to Los Angeles flight.” The controller seems shocked, saying: “I can’t really… I can’t hear what you’re saying there. You said American 11?” McDonnell replies, “Yes, we were hijacked… and it was a Boston-LA flight, and [Flight] 77 is a Dulles-LA flight and, uh, we’ve had an unconfirmed report a second airplane just flew into the World Trade Center.” The controller then abruptly ends the call, saying: “Thank you very much. Goodbye.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 106]

Controllers Make No Connection with Flight 77 - After hanging up, the Indianapolis Center controller immediately calls another of the center’s radar associates and repeats what he has just heard. They look through their flight plans but can find no record of Flight 11 in their system. According to author Lynn Spencer, the center’s host computer, which performs critical radar and flight management functions, only holds on to active flight plans. Therefore, several minutes after the system had stopped tracking the transponder data tag for Flight 11, its flight plan dropped out of the system. According to Spencer, the two controllers fail to connect what McDonnell has said with the disappearance of Flight 77: “The best the controllers can figure is that [Flight 11] was hijacked on the ground in New York and proceeded to take off for Los Angeles without a clearance. They’re not sure just how this is relevant to the disappearance of American 77, if at all, and they’ve done all they can do for now.… Confused, they return to their jobs.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 106-107]

Hijacking Not Suspected - At 9:08, the Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue to request that it be on the lookout for an accident involving Flight 77 (see (After 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and at 9:09 it informs the FAA regional office of a possible accident involving Flight 77 (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, according to the 9/11 Commission, it is not until about 9:20 that the center begins to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 has crashed, and discusses this concern with the FAA’s Herndon Command Center (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31-32]


Entity Tags: Jim McDonnell, American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Flight Control Tells Local FAA Flight 77 Is Missing, But FAA Headquarters and NORAD Are Not Yet ToldEdit event  

Indianapolis flight control reports the loss of contact with Flight 77 to the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center. They describe it as a possible crash. The center waits 15 minutes before passing the information to FAA headquarters at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, American Airlines headquarters has been notified of the same information before 9:00 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Remain in Holding Pattern over Ocean instead of Defending New York CityEdit event  

The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) have been directed to “Whiskey 105,” a military airspace training area over the Atlantic Ocean, just south of Long Island. According to the 9/11 Commission, “To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to ‘hold as needed.’ From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 85] Otis pilot Major Daniel Nash will later comment, “Neither the civilian controller or the military controller knew what they wanted us to do.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002]

'Pushback' from FAA Controllers - By 9:08 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, had learned of the second World Trade Center crash and wanted to send the Otis fighters to New York City. However, according to Vanity Fair, the NEADS “weapons techs get ‘pushback’ from civilian FAA controllers, who have final authority over the fighters as long as they are in civilian airspace. The FAA controllers are afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane, of which there are hundreds in the area, still flying normal routes.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Author Lynn Spencer will add: “[L]ocal FAA controllers are busy shutting down New York’s airspace and are less than eager to grant the fighters access to the civilian airspace. They’re afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with the hundreds of airliners that are still in the area. Many of those flights are doing unpredictable things just now, such as canceling their flight plans and changing course, and controllers are not convinced that they can provide adequate separation if fast-moving fighters are added to the mix. They just need a few more minutes, they keep saying.”

New York Center Not Answering Phone - Nasypany tries contacting the military liaison at the FAA’s New York Center, but no one is answering the phone. According to Spencer, “He wants the Otis fighters over New York, not in military airspace 100 miles off the coast, but he has little choice. Without permission from the FAA to penetrate the civil airspace over New York, NEADS must advise the Otis F-15 pilots… to continue to remain clear of the city.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111-112]

Director Wants Jets 'Closer In' - At 9:10 a.m., the senior director on the NEADS operations floor tells the weapons director, “I want those fighters closer in.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] NEADS weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick asks Major James Fox, the weapons team leader, “Can we give [the fighters] a mission?” Fox replies, “Right now their mission is to hold.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111] Then, at around 9:11 a.m., either the senior weapons director at NEADS or his technician instructs the Otis fighters to “remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance.”

Fighters Exit Holding Pattern for New York - Just before 9:13 a.m., the Otis pilots tell their controller at the FAA’s Boston Center that they need to establish a combat air patrol over New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan” (see 9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24]


Entity Tags: James Fox, Federal Aviation Administration, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Kevin Nasypany, Steve Hedrick, Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Requests Information on Unusual Flight Activity, Receives Numerous ReportsEdit event  

The FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia.

The FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration]

Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, puts the word out that he wants all air traffic control facilities around the US to inform him of anything unusual that occurs with the flights they are handling. In response, news of suspicious activity quickly starts coming in to the Command Center. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125-126]

Command Center Calls Field Facilities - Sliney wants air traffic control facilities to notify him of anything out of the ordinary, such as a radar target disappearing from the radar scope, loss of communication with an aircraft, or an aircraft making an unauthorized change of course. He also wants to know immediately of any glitches that occur, even if these are common, everyday problems, such as a flight deviating from its course, missing a frequency change, overlooking a radio call, or getting a transponder code wrong. The center’s controllers at each regional desk therefore start calling their field facilities, and ask them to report any unusual occurrences. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 pdf file; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125] The Command Center has telecommunications lines to all the major air traffic control facilities in the US, which enables it to reach out to those facilities and establish the big picture about aircraft activity. [FRENI, 2003, PP. 64]

'More and More' Responses Received - Following the call for information, numerous reports of suspicious activity are received from the air traffic control facilities. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 125-126] Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations at the Command Center, will later recall, “[W]e started getting more and more calls about bomb threats, about aircraft that we had lost communication or radar identification with.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12/17/2001]

Center Lists Suspect Aircraft - Sliney wants a list compiled of the reportedly suspicious aircraft. A dry-erase board is set up in the middle of the room. On it a manager keeps track of the reports that are coming in, writing down where each suspect aircraft was last seen, who was working it, where the flight originated, and where it is going. Another person contacts the field facilities to follow up on the reports. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/22/2003 pdf file; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 126]

Two Dozen Suspicious Flights - Author Pamela Freni will later describe, “[F]or the next several hours the call signs and status” of every suspicious aircraft will be recorded. Command Center personnel call “airline operations centers, trying to determine any crises on each flight. Only when each plane landed or was found safe did its identification information disappear from the board. Upward to two dozen were listed at one time, but ultimately the number was whittled to 11 highly suspicious cases” (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). “Nine of those airplanes would land safely. Two of them—AA 77 and UA 93—would not.” [FRENI, 2003, PP. 64-65]


Entity Tags: Linda Schuessler, Ben Sliney, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Wants Third Jet Launched from Langley, Meaning Unit Will Have No Supervisor of FlyingEdit event  

The operations manager with the unit at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, that is involved in NORAD’s air defense mission is instructed to prepare to launch three F-16s from the base, even though the unit only keeps two such jets on “alert.” [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118]

NEADS Calls Langley - Captain Craig Borgstrom is the operations manager of a detachment at Langley from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. In the event of an order to scramble the unit’s two alert F-16s, he would serve as the supervisor of flying (SOF), responsible for informing the pilots about their mission. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114, 116] The unit has just received the signal to put its alert jets on “battle stations,” with the pilots in the cockpits but the engines turned off (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 64; FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] After briefing one of the two alert pilots, Borgstrom is called by the crew chief to answer a phone call from someone at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) who wants to speak to him. In an urgent voice, the caller asks Borgstrom, “How many airplanes can you get airborne?” Borgstrom answers, “I have two F-16s at battle stations right now,” but the caller snaps: “That’s not what I asked! How many total aircraft can you launch?” Although Borgstrom is not on alert duty, he is an F-16 pilot. He responds: “Well, the only other pilot here is me—I can fly. I can give you three!” The caller instructs him: “Suit up and go fly! We need all of you at battle stations!” [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118]

Third Pilot Means No Supervisor - According to author Lynn Spencer, this order “is almost unthinkable. If [Borgstrom] goes up, there will be no supervisor of flying. During a scramble, it is the SOF’s responsibility to monitor the jets—to work with local controllers to ensure priority handling and to make sure that the pilots are receiving lawful launch orders. The SOF stays in close communication with NEADS to get any and all information about the mission to pass on to his pilots, and assesses weather, airfield status, and spare alert aircraft status in case of an abort by one of the primary fighters. If Borgy flies, there not only will be no SOF, there will be no officer left at the detachment!”

Borgstrom Notifies Others, Checks with Commander - Borgstrom heads out to inform others of the instruction. He speaks to one of the alert pilots, Major Dean Eckmann, telling him, “They want us to launch all planes and all pilots if we get scrambled!” According to Spencer, this request “doesn’t make any sense to Eckmann,” and his initial response is ”What?” But “he’s a military officer and he’ll follow orders,” and points Borgstrom to the unit’s third F-16, which is not kept on alert and is therefore unarmed. Borgstrom instructs the crew chief to arm the fighter’s gun; this will be the only ammunition he has when he takes off. After fetching his harness and helmet, he places a phone call to the commander of the 119th Fighter Wing, at the wing’s home in Fargo, North Dakota. Borgstrom is uncomfortable with the unprecedented situation he is in and feels compelled to notify his immediate higher-ups. He tells the commander: “Sir, they’re launching all three of us. I don’t know what’s going on, but there’s no ops supervision here at all!” The commander knows what has happened in New York from news reports, and so is aware of the situation. He tells Borgstrom: “Go! Our thoughts are with you. Godspeed.” Borgstrom then hangs up the phone and runs to his jet. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118-119] The three Langley jets will receive a scramble order at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) and are airborne by 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16]


Entity Tags: 119th Fighter Wing, Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom, Langley Air Force Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Directs Crisis Response through Video Conference with Top OfficialsEdit event  

Around this time, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke reaches the Secure Video Conferencing Center just off the main floor of the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. From there, he directs the response to the 9/11 attacks and stays in contact with other top officials through video links. Clarke claims that on video he can see Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Robert Mueller, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (filling in for the traveling Attorney General John Ashcroft), Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (filling in for the traveling Secretary of State Colin Powell), and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (filling in for the traveling Chairman Henry Shelton). National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is with Clarke, but she lets him run the crisis response, deferring to his longer experience on terrorism matters. Clarke is also told by an aide, “We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 2-4; AUSTRALIAN, 3/27/2004] According to the 9/11 Commission, logs indicate that Clarke’s video teleconference only begins at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is later than Clarke suggests, and CIA and FAA representatives only join it at 9:40 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36 AND 462] Other accounts claim that, rather than being involved in Clarke’s teleconference at this time, Donald Rumsfeld is still in his office waiting for his intelligence briefing (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Myers is in a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE, 10/17/2001; CLARKE, 2006, PP. 218-219] The 9/11 Commission claims that, “While important,” Clarke’s conference has “no immediate effect on the emergency defense efforts.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Yet, as the Washington Post puts it, “everyone seems to agree” Clarke is the chief crisis manager on 9/11. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/28/2004] Even Clarke’s later opponent, National Security Adviser Rice, calls him 9/11’s “crisis management guy.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 4/9/2004] The conference is where the government’s emergency defense efforts are concentrated.


Entity Tags: Larry D. Thompson, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Richard B. Myers, Richard Armitage, John Ashcroft, Robert S. Mueller III, Richard A. Clarke, Henry Hugh Shelton, Jane Garvey, Donald Rumsfeld, 9/11 Commission, George J. Tenet, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Flight AA 77, Richard Clarke


(9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Washington Flight Control Sees Unidentified Plane, Apparently Fails to Notify FAA or NORADEdit event  

Washington flight control notices a new eastbound plane entering its radar with no radio contact and no transponder identification. They do not realize it is Flight 77. They are aware of the hijackings and crashes of Flights 11 and 175, yet they apparently fail to notify anyone about the unidentified plane. [NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Another report says they never notice it, and it is only noticed when it enters radar coverage of Washington’s Dulles International Airport at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001]


Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


Soon After 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001: Mistaken Report of Flight 77 Crash Causes ConfusionEdit event  

When Indianapolis flight control reported the loss of contact with Flight 77 to the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001), an employee at an FAA flight service station (which particular one is unspecified) picks up on the communication and mistakenly calls the Ashland, Kentucky police to report a confirmed crash. Indianapolis controllers had noted the last known position of Flight 77 as being near the Ohio-Kentucky border, so this becomes part of the employee’s report. Indianapolis Center personnel, suspecting that Flight 77 may have crashed, subsequently contact the same police office, requesting information on any crashes. (An FAA report describes them contacting the West Virginia State Police at about 9:15 a.m. Ashland, though in Kentucky, is only a few miles out of West Virginia, so this may be referring the same incident.) Using the flight service station report as an actual accident, the police mistakenly confirm the crash, even though it never actually happened. A state helicopter is even dispatched to the plane’s last known coordinates, but there is nothing there. Time is lost in all the confusion. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; FRENI, 2003, PP. 29] It is not until about 9:20 a.m., when Indianapolis Center learns there are other hijacked aircraft in the system (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), that it will start to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 crashed. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] However, the report of a downed plane persists. Shortly before 10 a.m., Dale Watson, counterterrorism chief at the FBI, will say to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke over a video teleconference, “We have a report of a large jet crashed in Kentucky, near the Ohio line.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 13] According to USA Today, “The reports are so serious that [FAA Administrator Jane] Garvey notifies the White House that there has been another crash. Only later does she learn the reports are erroneous.” [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002]


Entity Tags: Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Takes Control of New York AirspaceEdit event  

NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) declares “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for New York airspace, which gives the military authority over the FAA for that airspace, and will enable the fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) to head toward the city. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] For the last few minutes, the two Otis fighters have been kept in a “holding pattern” in military airspace over the Atlantic Ocean (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001), and NEADS has been unable to get permission from the FAA for them to enter the civilian airspace over New York. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111-112]

Marr Wants AFIO - According to author Lynn Spencer, Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, now “decides that he is done waiting for FAA approval for his fighters to enter New York airspace.… He will play his ace card. There is one method for the military to override the FAA’s authority over the airspace, and it is called AFIO.” The declaration of AFIO will give the military “emergency authority to enter FAA-controlled airspace without permission.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] According to an FAA document, “Upon declaring ‘AFIO,’ NORAD assumes responsibility for [interceptor fighter jets] seeing and avoiding all known aircraft and ensuring safe intercept conduct.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 2/19/2004, PP. 4-12-1 - 4-12-2]

Nasypany Directed to Declare AFIO - Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, speaks over a direct phone line to Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, who is on the operations floor there. He orders him to declare AFIO for New York airspace and to immediately move the Otis fighters over the city. Nasypany then calls out across the operations floor to the weapons team, “Okay, we’re declaring AFIO at this time.” The directive is relayed immediately to the two Otis pilots, who will then leave their holding pattern and head toward Manhattan (see 9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Attendant Calls Parents and Confirms Hijacking, but Accounts Are ContradictoryEdit event  

Renee May.

Renee May. [Source: Family photo]

Renee May, a flight attendant on Flight 77, calls her parents in Las Vegas and reports her plane has been hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] According to author Tom Murphy, May previously tried calling the American Airlines flight services office at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, but all the lines there were busy. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 56-57] However, a summary of the phone calls made from the four hijacked planes that is presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial will make no mention of this earlier call. May’s first attempt at calling her parents, at 9:11 a.m., had not connected, but her second attempt a minute later is successful, and the call lasts for two-and-a-half minutes. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] According to reports shortly after 9/11 in the Las Vegas Review-Journal, May makes her call using a cell phone. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/15/2001] But at the Moussaoui trial it will be claimed she uses an Airfone. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 pdf file] According to most accounts, including that of the 9/11 Commission, she speaks to her mother, Nancy May. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 pdf file] But according to Murphy, she speaks with her father, Ronald May. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57] Renee reports that her plane is being hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31] Although it will be officially claimed that there are five hijackers on Flight 77, she says six individuals have taken over the plane (see Between 9:12 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 2-3 AND 9] Renee says the hijackers have moved people to the rear of the aircraft, though it is unclear whether she is referring to all of the passengers or just the flight’s crew. She tells her parent (either her mother or father, depending on the account) to call American Airlines and inform it of the hijacking. She gives three numbers in Northern Virginia to call. Before the time Flight 77 crashes, Renee May’s mother (or her father, according to Murphy) is able to contact an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport and pass on what their daughter has reported (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31; MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57]


Entity Tags: Ronald May, Nancy May, Renee May


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


Between 9:12 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight Attendant Describes Six Hijackers on Flight 77Edit event  

In a phone call from Flight 77, flight attendant Renee May describes six hijackers on her plane, yet official accounts will state there are only five. May is able to call her parents from Flight 77 to report that her plane has been hijacked (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She says six individuals have carried out the hijacking. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31] Yet, despite this, the official claim put forward by the FBI and later the 9/11 Commission will be that there are five hijackers—not six—on this flight. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/27/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 27] Apparently, the only other person to make a phone call from Flight 77 is passenger Barbara Olson, who reaches her husband (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/12/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 pdf file] But Olson does not appear to make any reference to the number of hijackers on the plane. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9]


Entity Tags: Ronald May, Renee May, Nancy May


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(Before 9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Arab Private Pilot Keeps Trying to Enter Washington AirspaceEdit event  

An air traffic controller at Washington’s Reagan National Airport struggles with an Arab-sounding private pilot who keeps veering into Washington airspace. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 144-145] Reagan National Airport is less than one mile from the Pentagon, and just a few miles from the White House and the Capitol building. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/3/2001] The airspace around it and much of Washington is designated class B airspace, which means no one is supposed to fly there without a working transponder and permission from an air traffic controller. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] Eric Cole, a controller in Reagan Airport’s air traffic control tower, is continually being bothered by the pilot, who has an Arab accent and is flying a banner tow airplane. Cole repeatedly directs the pilot, “Go further south!” The pilot replies, “Okay, I’m going further south,” but does not do so. He keeps infringing the Washington airspace and asking to get closer to the city. Banner tow airplanes are almost unheard of in this area, and Cole cannot understand why the pilot is being so persistent, almost argumentative. Finally, Cole yells at him: “No, you’re not going further south! I can see that you’re not going further south!” Shortly after 9:06 a.m., the control tower receives the instruction to secure the airspace around Washington and turn away all non-airliner aircraft (see Shortly After 9:06 a.m. September 11, 2001). The controllers are then able to order the annoying banner tow pilot out of their airspace for good. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 144-145]


Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Eric Cole


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Receives Confirmation of Flight 11 Hijacking, but Apparently Does Not Suspect Flight 77 Is HijackedEdit event  

An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), receives confirmation from American Airlines that Flight 11 was hijacked, but apparently still does not suspect that the missing Flight 77 may also have been hijacked. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] The controller, a sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center, called the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas five minutes earlier, and was informed by dispatcher Jim McDonnell that Flight 11 had been hijacked and that two planes had hit the World Trade Center (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 106] He now calls the dispatch office and again speaks with McDonnell. After introducing himself, he asks, “American 11, you guys said he departed off of, uh, New York?” McDonnell replies, “Boston.” The controller continues, “Boston, he was going to LA, and it was a hijacked airplane?” McDonnell confirms, “Yes.” The controller asks, “And you, have you heard anything from American 77?” McDonnell replies, “No,” and then adds, “I talked to a winder in the center up there, and I gave them the information I got.” (What McDonnell is referring to here is unclear.) The controller thanks McDonnell, and the call ends. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] Despite receiving this information from American Airlines, according to the 9/11 Commission it is not until about 9:20 that the Indianapolis Center begins to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 has crashed, and discusses this concern with the FAA’s Herndon Command Center (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32]


Entity Tags: Jim McDonnell, American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Asked to Issue Nationwide Cockpit Security Alert, but Does Not Act on RequestEdit event  

Daniel Bueno.

Daniel Bueno. [Source: Discovery Channel]

At “approximately 9:15 a.m.,” according to the 9/11 Commission, Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, asks the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to contact all the FAA centers nationwide and instruct them to issue an alert, informing all airborne aircraft of the events unfolding in New York and advising them to heighten their cockpit security. Boston Center air traffic controllers have recently issued a similar alert to all aircraft in their airspace (see 9:09 a.m.-9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25-26] However, the 9/11 Commission will conclude, “We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23] According to author Lynn Spencer, “The request never makes it to Ben Sliney,” the national operations manager at the Command Center. “Tragically, it is lost in the confusion and never gets past the staff person monitoring Sliney’s desk as events rapidly spiral out of control.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 99] But Ellen King, a Command Center manager, offers a different explanation. She will tell the 9/11 Commission that the FAA culture and mindset on 9/11 are such that the FAA “would never have relayed this message directly to all pilots.… [T]he FAA would pass situational awareness to the airline company representatives who, in turn, would determine if such action was necessary.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 AND 92]


Entity Tags: Daniel Bueno, Ellen King, Ben Sliney, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Orders Its Flights to Land ImmediatelyEdit event  

American Airlines orders all of its airborne flights to land at the nearest airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31] Managers at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas have learned of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center. Initially, they mistakenly believed this second plane was American Airlines Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). Gerard Arpey, the airline’s executive vice president for operations, conferred with other operational managers, and they all agreed that the airline needed to land its aircraft immediately. American Airlines’ president Don Carty then arrives at the SOC and also agrees, telling Arpey, “Do it.” So, at about 9:15, the airline orders all its planes to land at the nearest suitable airport. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] This is the first time an airline has ever ordered all its planes to land. [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] The FAA will give out a similar order to all its facilities about 30 minutes later (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 29] Around that time, United Airlines will also order its aircraft to land (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] American Airlines ordered a ground stop earlier on that prevented any new takeoffs of its aircraft (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31] Most of its domestic flights will have landed by about 11:50 a.m., though it will take longer to ground its international and trans-Pacific flights. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004]


Entity Tags: Gerard Arpey, American Airlines, Don Carty


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Solicitor General Olson Is Called by His Wife on Flight 77Edit event  

Barbara Olson.

Barbara Olson. [Source: Richard Eillis / Getty Images]

Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, talks over the phone with her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States, and gives details of the hijacking of her plane, but the call is cut off after about a minute. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] Flight 77 was hijacked between around 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see 8:51 a.m.-8:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8] Sometime later, Barbara Olson tries calling her husband from the plane. The call initially reaches Mercy Lorenzo, an operator for AT&T, and after a short conversation, Lorenzo connects her to Ted Olson’s office at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001]

Secretary Answers the Call - There, the call is answered by Lori Keyton, a secretary. Lorenzo says there is an emergency collect call from Barbara Olson for Ted Olson. Keyton says she will accept it. Barbara Olson is then put through. She starts asking, “Can you tell Ted…” but Keyton cuts her off and says, “I’ll put him on the line.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] Keyton then notifies Helen Voss, Ted Olson’s special assistant, about the call. She says Barbara Olson is on the line and in a panic. The call is then passed on to Ted Olson. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] Voss rushes up to him and says, “Barbara is on the phone.” Ted Olson has been watching the coverage of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television and was concerned that his wife might have been on one of the planes involved. He is therefore initially relieved at this news. However, when he gets on the phone with her, he learns about the crisis on Flight 77. [CNN, 9/14/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/28/2001; HUDSON UNION, 6/18/2014]

Barbara Olson Provides Details of the Hijacking - Barbara Olson tells her husband that her plane has been hijacked. She gives no information describing the hijackers. She says they were armed with knives and box cutters, but makes no mention of any of the crew members or passengers being stabbed or slashed by them. She says they moved all the passengers to the back of the plane and are unaware that she is making a phone call. After the couple have been talking for about a minute, the call is cut off. Ted Olson will then try to call Attorney General John Ashcroft on a direct line he has to Ashcroft but receive no answer. After that, he will call the Department of Justice command center and ask for someone there to come to his office (see (Between 9:17 a.m. and 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Barbara Olson will reach her husband again and provide more details about the hijacking a short time later (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/28/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32]

Barbara Olson Is 'Incredibly Calm' - Accounts will later conflict over how composed Barbara Olson sounds during the call. She “did not seem panicked,” according to Ted Olson. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] “She sounded very, very calm… in retrospect, enormously, remarkably, incredibly calm,” he will say. [CNN, 9/14/2001] But Keyton will say that when she answered the call, Barbara Olson “sounded hysterical.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] Ted Olson will add that he did not hear any noises on the plane other than his wife’s voice. [CNN, 9/14/2001]

Accounts Will Conflict over What Kind of Phone Is Used - Accounts will also be contradictory over whether Barbara Olson’s call is made using a cell phone or an Airfone. Keyton will say there is no caller identification feature on her phone and so she was unable to determine what kind of phone Barbara Olson used. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] Ted Olson will tell the FBI that he “doesn’t know if the calls [from his wife] were made from her cell phone or [an Airfone].” He will mention, though, that she “always has her cell phone with her.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] He will similarly tell Fox News that he is unsure whether his wife used her cell phone or an Airfone. He will say he initially assumed the call must have been made on an Airfone and she called collect because “she somehow didn’t have access to her credit cards.” [FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001] But he will tell CNN that she “called him twice on a cell phone.” [CNN, 9/12/2001] And in a public appearance in 2014, he will imply that she called him on her cell phone, saying, “I don’t know how Barbara managed to make her cell phone work” while she was in the air. [HUDSON UNION, 6/18/2014] Furthermore, a spokesman for Ted Olson will say that during the call, Barbara Olson said she was locked in the toilet. If correct, this would mean she must be using her cell phone. [DAILY MAIL, 9/12/2001; EVENING STANDARD, 9/12/2001] But in 2002, Ted Olson will tell the London Telegraph that his wife called him on an Airfone and add, “I guess she didn’t have her purse, because she was calling collect.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3/5/2002] And based on a study of all Airfone records, an examination of the cell phone records of all of the passengers who owned cell phones, and interviews with the people who received calls from the plane, the Department of Justice will determine that all of the calls from Flight 77 were made using Airfones.

Call Will Be Listed as Being Made to an 'Unknown' Number - A list compiled by the Department of Justice supposedly showing all of the calls made today from Flight 77 will include four “connected calls to unknown numbers” (see 9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission Report will determine that these include the two calls made by Barbara Olson to her husband. According to the information in the list, her first call must occur at 9:15 a.m., 9:20 a.m., or 9:25 a.m. However, the FBI and the Department of Justice will conclude that all four “connected calls to unknown numbers” were communications between Barbara Olson and her husband’s office. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455]

Barbara Olson Originally Planned to Fly Out a Day Earlier - Barbara Olson is a former federal prosecutor who is now a well-known political commentator on television. [INDEPENDENT, 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] She was flying to Los Angeles to attend a major media business conference and to appear on Bill Maher’s television show, Politically Incorrect, this evening. [CNN, 9/14/2001; HUDSON UNION, 6/18/2014] She was originally scheduled to be on Flight 77 on September 10, but delayed her departure because today is Ted Olson’s birthday, and she wanted to be with him on the night before and have breakfast with him this morning. [CNN, 9/12/2001; SCOTSMAN, 9/13/2001; HUDSON UNION, 6/18/2014] At around 9:00 a.m., Keyton received a series of about six to eight collect calls from an unknown caller that failed to go through (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Presumably these were made by Barbara Olson. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94] In an interview with the FBI on September 13, Ted Olson will mention some messages on his voicemail at his old law firm. Presumably, he will be suggesting that these were also from Barbara Olson (see (Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/13/2001]


Entity Tags: Barbara Olson, Helen Voss, Mercy Lorenzo, Lori Lynn Keyton, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Four Calls Are Made by an Unknown Person on Flight 77, Later Determined to Be Passenger Barbara OlsonEdit event  

Four calls are made from an Airfone on Flight 77 to an unknown number, which, it will later be determined, is the number of Solicitor General Ted Olson’s office at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC. This is according to a list supposedly showing all of the calls made from Flight 77 today that the Department of Justice will provide to the 9/11 Commission. The list will be “derived from a study of all phone records from the flight, an examination of the cell phone records of each of the passengers aboard [Flight 77] who owned cell phones, and interviews with those who received calls from the flight, as well as with family members of the other passengers and crew,” according to the 9/11 Commission. It will include four “connected calls to unknown numbers.” These are a call at 9:15 a.m. that lasts 1 minute 42 seconds; a call at 9:20 a.m. that lasts 4 minutes 34 seconds; a call at 9:25 a.m. that lasts 2 minutes 39 seconds; and a call at 9:30 a.m. that lasts 4 minutes 20 seconds. The calls are made by the caller dialing “0” on the Airfone. It is unclear why they dial this number, although an FBI report will suggest that “zero may have been dialed in an attempt to contact a live AT&T operator.” Additionally, according to this report, the caller “may have dialed a three and then another zero before the calls were terminated.” The calls include two calls that Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, makes to Ted Olson, her husband, according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will be unable to determine which of the four calls these are. Furthermore, the FBI and the Department of Justice will conclude that all four “connected calls to unknown numbers” are communications between Barbara Olson and her husband’s office. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/20/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94] And yet Ted Olson will later recall receiving only two calls from his wife this morning. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Lori Keyton, the secretary who initially answers them, will similarly describe receiving only two calls from Barbara Olson when she is interviewed by the FBI. Furthermore, she will say that Barbara Olson’s second call is made directly to Ted Olson’s office, rather than reaching it via an operator as the FBI report will indicate happens. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] And Mercy Lorenzo, the operator who connects Barbara Olson’s first call to Ted Olson’s office, will apparently describe dealing with only one call—not four—from Flight 77 when she is interviewed by the FBI. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] The 9/11 Commission will in fact note that there is no “direct evidence” showing that the four calls made by an unknown person on Flight 77 were made by Barbara Olson to her husband’s office. Department of Justice and FBI employees who brief the 9/11 Commission on the calls from Flight 77 will say they are “confident that they had identified all completed calls from the flight.” However, the information they provide will make no mention of a series of six to eight collect calls from an unknown caller that were received at Ted Olson’s office at around 9:00 a.m. but failed to connect (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It will include one call, though, supposedly made by Barbara Olson directly to her husband’s office at 9:18 a.m. that fails to connect. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94]


Entity Tags: Barbara Olson, US Department of Justice, Lori Lynn Keyton, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mercy Lorenzo, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Passenger Gives an Operator Details of the Hijacking of Her PlaneEdit event  

Mercy Lorenzo, an operator for telecommunications company AT&T, answers a call from Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, who provides details of the hijacking of her plane before Lorenzo connects her to her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. Barbara Olson makes the call using an Airfone on the back of one of the plane’s seats. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] She reaches Lorenzo by dialing “0.” It is unclear why she calls this number. An FBI report will later surmise that “zero may have been dialed in an attempt to contact a live AT&T operator.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/20/2001]

Barbara Olson Wants to Reach Her Husband - Barbara Olson asks to be connected to her husband and provides his telephone number. It is unclear whether she tells Lorenzo her name; Lorenzo will refer to her as a “female passenger” when she is later interviewed by the FBI. It is also unclear whether she tells Lorenzo the name of her husband or mentions his important position in the US government; in her FBI interview, Lorenzo will state that she refers to him as “a sergeant who resides in Washington, DC.”

Operator Is Told about the Hijacking of Flight 77 - Barbara Olson gives Lorenzo some details of the crisis on her plane. She says the flight is “currently being hijacked,” and the hijackers are armed with “guns and knives,” Lorenzo will recall. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] However, when she subsequently talks to her husband, Barbara Olson will say the hijackers have knives and box cutters, but make no mention of them having guns. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Barbara Olson also says that the hijackers are “ordering the passengers to move to the back of the plane,” according to Lorenzo. She adds that the passengers want to know “how to let the pilots know what [is] happening,” since it does “not appear as if they [are] aware of the situation.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001]

Call Is Connected to Ted Olson's Office - Lorenzo connects the call to Ted Olson’s office at the Department of Justice. She tells the secretary who answers it that there is “an emergency collect call.” After the secretary accepts it, the call is passed on to Ted Olson (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] A list supposedly showing all of the calls made today from Flight 77, compiled by the Department of Justice, will include four “connected calls to unknown numbers” (see 9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission Report will determine that these include the two calls Barbara Olson makes to her husband. According to the information in the list, the call that Lorenzo deals with must occur at 9:15 a.m., 9:20 a.m., or 9:25 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455]


Entity Tags: Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, Mercy Lorenzo, Barbara Olson


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Parent of Flight Attendant Informs American Airlines of Daughter’s Call from Flight 77Edit event  

Toni Knisley.

Toni Knisley. [Source: ReclaimingTheSky.com]

At some time before the Pentagon is hit, one of the parents of flight attendant Renee May call an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport just outside Washington, DC, and report that their daughter has contacted them from Flight 77, which has been hijacked. May called her parents at 9:12 a.m., reported that her plane was being hijacked, and asked them to pass this information on to American Airlines (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31] The Las Vegas Review-Journal reports that it is May’s mother, Nancy May, who makes the call to American Airlines. [LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, 9/13/2001] This claim is repeated at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial. [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 7 pdf file] But according to author Tom Murphy, it is her father, Ronald May, who makes the call. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 57] The parent describes the information provided by their daughter, including her flight number and her phone number on board the plane. According to the 9/11 Commission, the American Airlines employee initially thinks May’s mother (who the Commission indicates makes the call) is talking about the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center. But Nancy May repeats that she is referring to Flight 77, which is still in the air. (The error could possibly be because, by 9:08 a.m., officials at American Airlines’ System Operations Control in Texas mistakenly concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center may have been Flight 77 (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).) [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31] The employee, a secretary, then passes on the information about May’s call to Toni Knisley, a flight service manager at the airport. Knisley rushes to her office and enters May’s employee number into the computer to call up her schedule. This shows she was booked on Flight 77, Washington Dulles Airport to Los Angeles, scheduled to depart at 8:10 a.m. Knisley tries to log onto the flight to view its status, but the information is blocked, so she cannot see if it is still flying or where it is. [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 56-57] (It is possible the information is blocked as a result of American Airlines having already initiated “lockout” procedures to protect information about Flight 77 (see 9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001).)


Entity Tags: American Airlines, Renee May, Nancy May, Ronald May, Toni Knisley


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Contacts FAA; Thinks Flight 77 May Have Hit the WTCEdit event  

Bill Halleck, an American Airlines air traffic control specialist at the airline’s System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, phones an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, to ask about the status of New York City air traffic. During their two-and-a-half minute conversation, Halleck says American thinks Flight 11 crashed into the WTC, and says that Flight 77 is “missing.” Presently, he receives an update from someone else at SOC, indicating that Flight 77 may also have crashed into the WTC (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). He wonders how it could have gotten to New York, but updates the FAA official on this news. The FAA official replies that the second WTC crash may not have been Flight 77 because “we have another call sign” for that incident. The FAA Command Center is currently uncertain of the identity of either of the planes that hit the Twin Towers, and provides no further information. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 AND 94]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Halleck, American Airlines


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Between 9:17 a.m. and 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Solicitor General Olson Alerts the Justice Department Command Center to the Hijacking of Flight 77Edit event  

Ted Olson.

Ted Olson. [Source: US Department of Justice]

Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States, calls the Department of Justice command center to pass on information he has received in a call from his wife, who is a passenger on Flight 77, and ask for someone there to come to his office. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32, 95] His wife, Barbara Olson, has just called him, and was able to say her plane had been hijacked and give him details of the hijacking before the call got cut off (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Olson Is Unable to Reach Attorney General Ashcroft - After the call from his wife has ended, Ted Olson tries to call Attorney General John Ashcroft on a direct line he has to Ashcroft, but receives no answer. He then calls the Department of Justice command center to pass on the details of his wife’s call. He contacts the command center, he will later say, because he wants to give Barbara Olson’s information “to someone who could possibly do something.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; NEWSWEEK, 9/28/2001] “I mainly wanted them know there was another hijacked plane out there,” he will comment. [FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001]

Olson Is Told Command Center Personnel Are Unaware of the Hijacking - He tells the person who answers the call that his wife’s plane has been hijacked and gives them the number of the flight. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] “I want you to know there’s another plane that’s been hijacked; my wife is on it,” he says. [NEWSWEEK, 9/28/2001] He adds that his wife is able to communicate from the plane, even though her call to him got cut off. [CNN, 9/14/2001] “They just absorbed the information,” he will recall, adding, “I expected them to pass the information on to the appropriate people.” [FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001] He is told that officials in the command center know nothing about the hijacking of Flight 77. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001]

Olson Wants a Security Officer to Come to His Office - Ted Olson also requests that a security officer from the command center come to his office. According to Helen Voss, his special assistant, he does this because he thinks the security officer will be able to talk to Barbara Olson if she calls him again. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] But Ted Olson will comment that at this time, “I didn’t know that I was going to get another call [from Barbara Olson].” He is told someone will be sent to his office right away. [FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001] Shortly after he contacts the command center, Barbara Olson will call him a second time and provide more details about the hijacking of Flight 77 (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32]

Security Officer Goes to Olson's Office - Meanwhile, Allen Ferber, a security officer in the command center, is told to go to Ted Olson’s office. He is told by the watch officer that the solicitor general’s wife is on a plane that has been hijacked, the hijackers were armed with knives, and the passengers have been moved to the back of the plane. He will arrive at Ted Olson’s office after Barbara Olson’s second call from Flight 77 has ended. He will stay there, watching the television coverage of the crashes at the World Trade Center with Ted Olson, for about 10 minutes. He will leave the office before the attack on the Pentagon is reported on television (see 9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001) but return to it after the attack starts being reported (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001]


Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Allen Ferber, John Ashcroft, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, Helen Voss


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Technicians Say They Are Willing to Order an Aircraft ShootdownEdit event  

Personnel on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) confirm to their mission crew commander (MCC) that they are prepared to issue an order to fighter pilots, telling them to fire on a commercial airliner.

MCC Concerned about Possible Shootdown - Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS MCC, is concerned about what might happen next as the day’s crisis unfolds. He realizes he may need to order fighter jets under his command to shoot down an errant aircraft. He therefore starts walking up and down the operations floor, impatiently asking all his section heads and weapons technicians, “Are you prepared to follow an order to shoot down a civilian airliner?” All of them affirm that they will issue such an order if required to do so.

Nasypany Confers with Marr - Satisfied with their answers, Nasypany gets on the phone to Colonel Robert Marr, who is in the NEADS battle cab, and asks him, “Have we already asked the questions?” What Nasypany means is, have they asked about getting authorization to take out a threatening aircraft? According to author Lynn Spencer, “Those authorizations, [Nasypany] knows, are going to have to come from the president himself, passed down from senior NORAD command in Colorado Springs.” Marr replies that Major General Larry Arnold, who is at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, is seeking the necessary authorizations and is prepared to take any action required. Nasypany then briefs Marr on the armaments on board the fighters NEADS has had launched (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). He adds: “My recommendation, if we have to take anybody out, large aircraft, we use AIM-9s in the face. If need be.” He means that if there is another hijacking, the most effective way to bring the plane down would be to fire a missile into its nose. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 140-141]

Pilots Do Not Receive Shootdown Authorization - At around 9:35 a.m., according to Spencer, a NEADS weapons controller will ask one of the pilots that launched in response to the first hijacking whether he would be willing to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] According to the 9/11 Commission, however, NEADS personnel will only learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then they will not pass this order along to the fighter pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43]


Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany, Northeast Air Defense Sector


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Sets Up Ineffectual Hijacking TeleconferenceEdit event  

The FAA sets up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. This is almost one hour after the FAA’s Boston flight control began notifying the chain of command (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001) and notified other flight control centers about the first hijacking at 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, this teleconference (called the “hijack net”) is “the fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, [Defense Department], FBI, Secret Service, and… other agencies.” Yet even after the delay in setting it up, FAA and Defense Department participants later claim it plays no role in coordinating the response to the hijackings. The 9/11 Commission says, “The NMCC [National Military Command Center inside the Pentagon] officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36] According to a statement provided by the FAA to the 9/11 Commission in 2003, this teleconference began significantly earlier—“[w]ithin minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Monte Belger, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s Indianapolis Center Finally Aware of National Crisis; Discusses Flight 77 Concerns with Command CenterEdit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which was monitoring Flight 77 when it disappeared from radar (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001), has learned by 9:20 a.m. that there are “other hijacked aircraft,” and begins “to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] In fact, a transcript of air traffic controller communications will show that the Indianapolis Center was informed of the Flight 11 hijacking, and that two planes had hit the World Trade Center, at 9:09 a.m. (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001); five minutes later, it received confirmation of the Flight 11 hijacking (see 9:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001] And television networks have been covering the crashes in New York since as early as 8:48 a.m. (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 16-17]

Other Facilities Notified - The manager at the Indianapolis Center now discusses the concern that Flight 77 may not have crashed with the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. This discussion prompts the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 is lost. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] Also at around 9:20, the Indianapolis Center operations manager contacts the FAA’s Chicago Center. He advises its operations manager of his concern that Flight 77 may have been hijacked, and says to be on the lookout, based on the events that have occurred in New York. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file] By 9:21, according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA “Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24-25]


Entity Tags: Chicago flight control, Federal Aviation Administration, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, American Airlines


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Solicitor General Olson Receives a Second Call from His Wife on Flight 77Edit event  

The telephone Ted Olson used when he spoke to his wife, who called him from Flight 77.

The telephone Ted Olson used when he spoke to his wife, who called him from Flight 77. [Source: US Department of Justice]

Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, talks over the phone with her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States, for a second time and is able to give him additional details of the hijacking of her plane before the call gets cut off. She has just called him at his office at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC, and was able to say her plane had been hijacked and give him details of the hijacking before the call got disconnected (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Since then, Ted Olson has called the Department of Justice command center and passed on the information she provided (see (Between 9:17 a.m. and 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32]

Secretary Answers the Call - Shortly after making her first call to him, Barbara Olson calls Ted Olson again. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The call is initially answered by Lori Keyton, a secretary in Ted Olson’s office. When Keyton picks up the phone, Barbara Olson says, “It’s Barbara.” Keyton says she will put her through to her husband. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] Ted Olson is told his wife is on the phone again and the call is put through to him.

Barbara Olson Says Her Plane Has Been Circling Around - Barbara Olson then gives her husband additional information about the hijacking of Flight 77. She says the pilot announced that the plane had been hijacked. Ted Olson asks if she has any idea of her plane’s location. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] She says the plane was hijacked shortly after takeoff and has been circling around for a while. [CNN, 9/14/2001; FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001] (However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Flight 77 was hijacked between around 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:54 a.m. September 11, 2001), more than 30 minutes after it took off (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8] ) She says it is currently flying over some houses. After consulting another person on the plane, she says she thinks they are heading northeast.

Barbara Olson Asks What She Should Tell the Pilot - Ted Olson says two aircraft, besides Flight 77, were hijacked this morning and these planes subsequently crashed into the World Trade Center. Barbara Olson “absorbed the information,” the solicitor general will later recall. The couple then try to reassure each other. Ted Olson says, “It’s going to come out okay” and Barbara Olson tells him the same thing. She then says, “I love you.” Before the call ends, the couple “segued back and forth between expressions of feeling for one another and this effort to exchange information,” Ted Olson will recall. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] “We exchanged the feelings that a husband and wife who are extraordinarily close—as we are—those kind of sentiments,” he will say. [FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001] The last thing Barbara Olson says is: “What shall I tell the pilot? What can I tell the pilot to do?” This implies that either the plane’s pilot or the co-pilot is at the back of the plane, where the hijackers moved the passengers, Ted Olson will note. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001]

Call Is Abruptly Cut Off - The call then ends abruptly, with the line suddenly going dead. It has lasted “two or three or four minutes,” Ted Olson will estimate. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] Ted Olson will then return to watching the coverage of the attacks at the WTC on television. When he sees the reports about an attack at the Pentagon, he will immediately think his wife’s plane crashed there (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FOX NEWS, 9/14/2001]

Call Is Made Sometime between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. - The exact time of Barbara Olson’s second call to her husband is unclear. A list compiled by the Department of Justice supposedly showing all of the calls made today from Flight 77 will include four “connected calls to unknown numbers” (see 9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001) and the 9/11 Commission Report will determine that these include the two calls made by Barbara Olson. According to the information in the list, her second call must occur at 9:20 a.m., 9:25 a.m., or 9:30 a.m. and last for 4 minutes 34 seconds, 2 minutes 39 seconds, or 4 minutes 20 seconds. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 455; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 94]

Call Is Made Directly to Ted Olson's Office - It is also unclear whether Barbara Olson makes this call using a cell phone or an Airfone. Keyton’s phone has no caller identification feature and so she is unable to determine what kind of phone Barbara Olson uses. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] But the Department of Justice will determine that all of the calls from Flight 77 were made using Airfones. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/20/2004] Barbara Olson makes the call by dialing “0,” apparently in an attempt to reach an operator, according to an FBI report. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/20/2001] But Keyton will say that, unlike the first call, Barbara Olson’s second call to her husband is made directly to his office, rather than reaching it via an operator. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001] And Mercy Lorenzo, the operator who connected Barbara Olson’s first call to Ted Olson’s office (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will apparently mention dealing with only one call, not two, from Barbara Olson when she is interviewed by the FBI. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001]


Entity Tags: Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, Mercy Lorenzo, Lori Lynn Keyton, Barbara Olson


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Passenger Phone Calls


(Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transportation Secretary Mineta Reaches Bunker, Meets Vice President CheneyEdit event  

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta. 

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta. [Source: US Department of Transportation]

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta arrives at the White House bunker—the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC)—containing Vice President Dick Cheney and others. Mineta will tell NBC News that he arrives there at “probably about 9:27,” though he later says to the 9/11 Commission that he arrives at “about 9:20 a.m.” He also later recalls that Cheney is already there when he arrives. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004; ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006] This supports accounts of Cheney reaching the bunker not long after the second WTC crash (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Questioned about this in 2007 by an activist group, Mineta will confirm that Cheney was “absolutely… already there” in the PEOC when he arrived, and that “This was before American Airlines [Flight 77] went into the Pentagon,” which happens at 9:37. Yet, while admitting there is “conflicting evidence about when the vice president arrived” in the PEOC, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the “vice president arrived in the room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” Mineta also later claims that when he arrives in the PEOC, Mrs. Lynne Cheney, the wife of the vice president, is already there. Yet the 9/11 Commission will claim she only arrives at the White House at 9:52 (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40; 911TRUTHSEATTLE (.ORG), 6/26/2007] Once in the PEOC, Mineta establishes open phone lines with his office at the Department of Transportation and with the FAA Operations Center. [ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 6/3/2006]


Entity Tags: Lynne Cheney, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Norman Mineta


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Dick Cheney


(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: White House Begins Slowly EvacuatingEdit event  

The White House begins slowly evacuating around this time, according to some accounts. In a 9:52 a.m. report, CNN White House correspondent John King will state that “about 30 minutes ago,” the White House had begun “slowly evacuating.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] White House pastry chef Roland Mesnier will write in his 2006 memoirs that the evacuation begins at “exactly 9:18.” At this time, Secret Service agents tell Mesnier to “go out, right now,” because, Mesnier is told, “a plane was targeting the White House and would be there soon.” [MESNIER AND MALARD, 2006, PP. 361] The evacuation proceeds in an orderly fashion. But later on, around 9:45 a.m., those evacuating will be ordered to run (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001]


Entity Tags: John King, US Secret Service, Roland Mesnier


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Washington Office Is Warned Flight 77 Has Been HijackedEdit event  

Arthur Eberhart.

Arthur Eberhart. [Source: Spc. Edgar R. Gonzalez]

In a government report analyzing the effectiveness of rescue worker response to the Pentagon crash, it is mentioned that, “At about 9:20 a.m., the WFO [FBI Washington Field Office] Command Center [is] notified that American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked shortly after takeoff from Washington Dulles International Airport. [Special Agent in Charge Arthur] Eberhart dispatche[s] a team of 50 agents to investigate the Dulles hijacking and provide additional security to prevent another. He sen[ds] a second team to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as a precautionary step. At the WFO Command Center, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jim Rice [is] on the telephone with the Pentagon when Flight 77 crashe[s] into the building.” [US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 7/2002, PP. C-55] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is not told that Flight 77 had been hijacked at this time or any time before it crashes. However, the FAA has claimed they officially warned NORAD at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and informally warned them even earlier (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Arthur Eberhart, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Albert T. Church III, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, FBI Washington Field Office


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Control Facility Advised to Look for Flight 77Edit event  

The air traffic control tower at Dulles International Airport.

The air traffic control tower at Dulles International Airport. [Source: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority]

The FAA’s Herndon Command Center informs a supervisor at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport that the FAA has lost contact with American Airlines Flight 77 and is trying to locate it. The Dulles TRACON then informs its air traffic controllers that a commercial aircraft is missing, and instructs them to look for primary targets on their radar screens. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 25; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] (A primary target is a radar track that provides an aircraft’s position and speed, but not its altitude, and which can still be viewed when the plane’s transponder has been turned off. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; SALON, 9/10/2004] ) Dulles Airport is located 26 miles west of Washington, DC, and 22 miles from the Pentagon. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/19/1994; USA TODAY, 9/13/2001] According to the 9/11 Commission, controllers at its TRACON will locate an unidentified aircraft on their radar screens at 9:32 (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), although other accounts will suggest they locate the target slightly earlier (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 33]


Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Mistakenly Tells NEADS Flight 11 Is Still AirborneEdit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center. Colin Scoggins, Boston Center’s military liaison, tells it: “I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.… That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.… I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.” The NEADS official asks: “He—American 11 is a hijack?… And he’s heading into Washington?” Scoggins answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston Center has been told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the 9/11 Commission will say it hasn’t been able to find where this mistaken information came from.

Scoggins Makes Error - Vanity Fair magazine will later add, “In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.” Scoggins will explain why he believes he made this error: “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” He says he was monitoring a conference call between FAA centers (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), “when the word came across—from whom or where isn’t clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington.” However, Boston Center was never tracking Flight 11 on radar after losing sight of it near Manhattan: “The plane’s course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC. This was all controllers were going on.” Scoggins says, “After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air.” [NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006]

Myers Refers to Mistaken Report - In the hours following the attacks, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers will apparently refer to this erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, telling the Associated Press that “prior to the crash into the Pentagon, military officials had been notified that another hijacked plane had been heading from the New York area to Washington.” Myers will say “he assumed that hijacked plane was the one that hit the Pentagon, though he couldn’t be sure.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001]


Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight AA 77


(Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Airline Managers Join Teleconference but Receive No Guidance; Timing UnclearEdit event  

Managers from American Airlines and United Airlines are added by the FAA to a teleconference, but they receive no guidance from top government officials on what to do. According to author Lynn Spencer, at some point after the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the executives from the two airlines are “quickly on the phone to FAA headquarters and the FAA Command Center.” They are brought into “a conference call that has now been set up with Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and Vice President Dick Cheney at the White House. The airline executives inform the secretary that they are each dealing with additional aircraft that they are unable to contact. They seek guidance, but there is none.… The nation is under attack, but there is no plan in place, and no guidance is forthcoming from the top as the crisis escalates.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] The time when the airline executives join the teleconference is unclear. In Spencer’s account, she places it after United Airlines dispatchers have warned their aircraft to secure their cockpits (see (Shortly After 9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean some time after 9:21. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] But Spencer also says that, when the executives join the conference, the “president is still reading to children in a Florida school room” (see (9:08 a.m.-9:13 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would be roughly between 9:05 and 9:15. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38-39; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 109] If Norman Mineta is already participating in the teleconference when the airline executives join it, the time would have to be after around 9:20, which is when Mineta later says he arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] And Cheney, who Spencer also says is participating in the teleconference when the executives join it, arrives at the PEOC as late as 9:58, according to the 9/11 Commission, although other accounts indicate he arrives there much earlier than this (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40] According to the Wall Street Journal, American Airlines president Don Carty and United Airlines CEO Jim Goodwin are talking on the phone with Mineta (presumably over the conference call) about five minutes before the FAA shuts down all US airspace (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean they are participating in the teleconference by around 9:40 a.m. [US CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 9/21/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001]


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Don Carty, United Airlines, Norman Mineta, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, American Airlines, Jim Goodwin


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Wants Fighters to Track Phantom Flight 11Edit event  

Major Kevin Nasypany inside NEADS

Major Kevin Nasypany inside NEADS [Source: Mark Schafer/ Vanity Fair]

According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS has just been told that the hijacked Flight 11 is still in the air and heading toward Washington. Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, says to NEADS Commander Robert Marr, “Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.” After receiving approval to do so, Nasypany issues the order. “Okay… scramble Langley,” he says. “Head them towards the Washington area.” The Langley, Virginia, base gets the scramble order at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). NEADS keeps its fighters from the Otis base over New York City. In 2004 the 9/11 Commission will state, “this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or [Defense Department]. Instead, since 9/11, the scramble of the Langley fighters has been described as a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two.” Yet the “report of American 11 heading south as the cause of the Langley scramble is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD, and in other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006]


Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Continental NORAD Region Headquarters Wants Otis Fighters Details Sent over Chat SystemEdit event  

At NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician, receives a call from the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. Major General Larry Arnold and his staff at Tyndall AFB are trying to gather as much information as they can about the ongoing crisis, and want to know the transponder codes for the two fighter jets scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the first hijacking (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), so they can monitor their positions. The CONR officer that makes the call tells McCain to “send [the transponder codes] out on chat,” meaning on NORAD’s own chat system.

NORAD's Computer Chat System - According to author Lynn Spencer, NORAD’s chat system “is similar to the chat rooms on most Internet servers, but classified.” It has three chat rooms that can be used by anyone with proper access. One room is specifically for NEADS, and connects its ID, surveillance, and weapons technicians to its alert fighter squadrons, and is where NEADS gets status reports on fighter units and their aircraft. Another chat room is for CONR, and is where the three CONR sectors—NEADS, the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)—communicate with each other and can “upchannel” information to CONR headquarters. The third room is the Air Warfare Center (AWC), where senior NORAD commanders from the three NORAD regions—CONR, Canada, and Alaska—communicate with each other. NEADS is allowed to monitor this room, but not type into it. When there is a training exercise taking place, as was the case earlier this morning (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), one or two additional chat windows will be open specifically for communicating exercise information, to help prevent it being confused with real-world information.

McCain Falling Behind - McCain’s responsibilities at NEADS include monitoring these chat rooms, keeping paper logs of everything that is going on, and taking care of “upchanneling” operational reports to higher headquarters. According to Spencer, “These chat logs help to keep everyone on the same page, but in a situation like the one unfolding they have to be updated almost instantaneously to achieve that end.” But, “The fact that CONR has had to call McCain to get information that by now he would normally have posted alerts him that he is falling behind despite his best efforts.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 139-140]


Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Joe McCain, Larry Arnold


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Orders Jets Scrambled from Langley; Conflicting Explanations Later Given for OrderEdit event  

Alan Scott.

Alan Scott. [Source: United States Air Force]

NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) processes and transmits an order to Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, to scramble three of its F-16 fighter jets. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany instructed his personnel to issue this order one minute earlier (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). Although he’d originally wanted the Langley jets sent to the Washington area, he will soon adjust this heading to send them to the Baltimore area. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27]

NEADS Orders Jets North - A NEADS officer calls Langley Air Force Base and instructs: “Langley command post, this is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Quit 2-5 and Quit 2-6.… Scramble immediately.… Scramble on a heading of 010, flight level 290.” This means the jets are to head in a direction just east of north, at an altitude of 29,000 feet. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/9/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 96; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] At Langley Air Force Base, a Klaxon horn will sound, notifying the pilots of the scramble order (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), and they will be airborne by 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141]

Fighters Launched in Response to Flight 77? - In later testimony, military officials will give contradictory explanations for why the Langley F-16s are scrambled. An early NORAD timeline will indicate the fighters are launched in response to NORAD being notified at 9:24 that Flight 77 has been hijacked (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR), will suggest the same, telling the 9/11 Commission: “At 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of [Flight] 77.… And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 1ST AIR FORCE, 8/8/2006] And a timeline provided by senior Defense Department officials to CNN will state, “NORAD orders jets scrambled from Langley” in order to “head to intercept” Flight 77. [CNN, 9/17/2001]

In Response to Flight 93? - However, Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will give a different explanation. He will tell the 9/11 Commission, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003]

In Response to Incorrect Report about Flight 11? - In 2004, the 9/11 Commission will dispute both these previous explanations, and conclude that the Langley jets are scrambled in response to an incorrect report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, DC (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 26-27; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 15] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will corroborate this account. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, its conclusion is also confirmed by “taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 34] Major Nasypany will tell the Commission that the reason the Langley jets are directed toward the Baltimore area is to position them between the reportedly southbound Flight 11 and Washington, as a “barrier cap.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27 AND 461] John Farmer, senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will later suggest that NORAD deliberately misled Congress and the Commission by hiding the fact that the Langley scramble takes place in response to the erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne. He will write that the mistaken report “appears in more logs, and on more tapes, than any other single event that morning.… It was the reason for the Langley scramble; it had triggered the Air Threat Conference Call. Yet it had never been disclosed; it was, instead, talked around.” [FARMER, 2009, PP. 266-267]

Conflicting Times - Early news reports will put the time of the scramble order slightly later than the 9/11 Commission places it, between 9:25 and “about 9:27.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; CNN, 9/19/2001] But a NORAD timeline released a week after the attacks will give the same time as the Commission does, of 9:24. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27]


Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Kevin Nasypany, Alan Scott, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Langley Air Force Base, US Department of Defense, Northeast Air Defense Sector


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Regional Center Contacts Headquarters about Flight 77Edit event  

The FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notifies the Operations Center at FAA’s Washington headquarters of the simultaneous loss of radar identification and radar communications with Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] This is almost 30 minutes after this loss of contact occurred (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001), and 15 minutes after the Great Lakes regional center was informed of it (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighter Jets Scrambled from Langley Air Force BaseEdit event  

Major Brad Derrig.

Major Brad Derrig. [Source: ABC]

At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the pilots of three F-16s receive the order to scramble (i.e. take off immediately). A Klaxon horn sounds and the status lights in the hangars change from yellow to green, notifying them of the order. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 65; FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 141] The fighter jets belong to the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing. The wing has a small detachment at Langley that serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, responsible for defending the nation against attack. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114] The jets are already at “battle stations,” with the pilots in the cockpits but the engines off (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 55; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 117-119] The scramble order has just been issued by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16]

Third Pilot Launched - The unit at Langley keeps two F-16s on “alert”—armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 2/2002; BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17] But NEADS has instructed it to launch as many aircraft as it can (see (Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so the unit’s operations manager Captain Craig Borgstrom is also preparing to take off in a third jet. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 118-119] Major Dean Eckmann calls the other two pilots, saying, “Quit check,” indicating a radio check. Major Brad Derrig responds, “Two.” Borgstrom replies: “Three. I’m going with you!” This is news to Derrig. According to author Lynn Spencer, Derrig is “stunned.… [N]ot much surprises him, but this does.” Borgstrom joining them as a pilot will mean that, in the middle of this unprecedented crisis, their unit will be left without a commanding officer. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142]

Only Two Jets Fully Armed - The two jets that are kept on alert are fully armed. As Eckmann will later recall, “We can carry M9 heat seekers, Sidewinders for the M7 Sparrow, plus we have an internal 20 mm Vulcan cannon, and we were pretty much armed with all that.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] However, Borgstrom’s jet has guns only, and though the six-barrel 20 mm gun can fire 6,000 rounds per minute, it requires close range.

Pilot Unqualified to Lead Three Jets - As the three aircraft taxi out to the runway, Eckmann is concerned that he has not yet qualified as a mission commander—a “four-ship”—and is therefore not authorized to lead more than one fighter jet. He calls the other pilots, saying, “Hey, I’m only a two-ship!” But Derrig, who is a full-time instructor pilot for the Air National Guard, urges him not to worry. He responds: “Press! I’m an instructor,” giving his approval for the flight to operate as a “three-ship” under Eckmann’s lead. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 142] The three jets will take off and be airborne by 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16]


Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, 119th Fighter Wing, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: By Some Accounts, FAA Notifies NORAD Flight 77 Is Hijacked and Washington-Bound; 9/11 Commission Claims This Never HappensEdit event  

Shortly after 9/11, NORAD reported that the FAA notified them at this time that Flight 77 “may” have been hijacked and that it appears headed toward Washington. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Apparently, flight controllers at Dulles International Airport discover a plane heading at high speed toward Washington; an alert is sounded within moments that the plane appears to be headed toward the White House. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/3/2001] In 2003, the FAA supported this account, but claimed that they had informally notified NORAD earlier. “NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 5/22/2003] Yet in 2004, the 9/11 Commission claims that both NORAD and the FAA are wrong. The 9/11 Commission explains that the notification NEADS received at 9:24 a.m. was the incorrect information that Flight 11 had not hit the WTC and was headed south for Washington, D.C. Thus, according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is never notified by the FAA about the hijacking of Flight 77, but accidentally learns about it at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]


Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Key Day of 9/11 Events


9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Plane Still at Airport Mistakenly Reported as HijackedEdit event  

Marcus Arroyo.

Marcus Arroyo. [Source: Airport Press]

An FAA regional manager mistakenly reports that a United Airlines plane has been hijacked, and it is soon discovered that the plane is still on the ground at Boston’s Logan Airport. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/8/2003 pdf file] Marcus Arroyo, the security division manager for the FAA’s eastern region, is in the command center on the fifth floor of the FAA building at New York’s JFK International Airport, responding to the attacks on the World Trade Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/24/2003 pdf file] He calls Mark Randol, the manager of the FAA’s Washington, DC, Civil Aviation Security Field Office, who is based at Washington Dulles International Airport. As Randol will later recall, Arroyo makes it clear to him that this is a terrorist attack and reports several hijackings. These hijackings include Flight 175 (the second plane to hit the WTC) and Flight 77 (which will hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m.). Arroyo also reports, erroneously, that another plane, United Airlines Flight 177, has been hijacked. Randol immediately instructs his staff members to find out all they can about these flights. By 9:45 a.m., they will have identified that Flight 77 had taken off from Dulles Airport, but are unable to confirm whether it has been hijacked. They also discover that United Airlines Flight 177 is in fact still on the ground at Logan Airport, being held at the gate there. [9/11 COMMISSION, 10/8/2003 pdf file] The reason for Arroyo’s incorrect report of this plane being hijacked is unknown.


Entity Tags: Marcus Arroyo, Mark Randol


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Reportedly Notice Flight 77, Earlier than 9/11 Commission ClaimsEdit event  

According to an FAA report, between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., air traffic controllers at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified blip, later identified to be Flight 77, on their radar screens. This is several minutes earlier than the 9/11 Commission will claim they notice it. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9]

Plane Flying East at High Speed - The TRACON at Dulles Airport, which is about 22 miles west of the Pentagon, learned several minutes earlier that the FAA had lost contact with Flight 77. It then advised its controllers to look out for “primary targets” (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA TODAY, 9/13/2001; NAVY TIMES, 9/22/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32] These are radar tracks that can still be viewed when a plane’s transponder has been turned off. [SALON, 9/10/2004] Several of the facility’s controllers now observe a primary radar target heading eastbound toward Washington at high speed, almost 500 miles per hour. Although the aircraft has no transponder signal to identify it, it is later determined to be Flight 77. [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file; USA TODAY, 8/12/2002]

Conflicting Times - According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Dulles TRACON controllers only notice this aircraft at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] The FAA report, which is published less than a week after 9/11, will state that its time of between 9:25 and 9:30 is “approximate, based on personnel statements from Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control.” [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 pdf file] But this earlier time will receive some corroboration from a report in USA Today, which states that the FAA’s Command Center is notified by a Dulles controller of the unidentified aircraft at “just before 9:30 a.m.” [USA TODAY, 8/12/2002] Furthermore, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, who is currently at the White House, will tell the 9/11 Commission that at “about 9:25 or 9:26” he overhears someone warning Vice President Dick Cheney of an aircraft approaching Washington (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Radar evidence obtained by CBS News will show that “at 9:30 a.m.… radar tracked the plane as it closed to within 30 miles of Washington.” [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001]


Entity Tags: Washington Dulles International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:25 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles Airport Controllers Mistake Flight 77 for a Military FighterEdit event  

Todd Lewis.

Todd Lewis. [Source: NBC]

After air traffic controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport notice an unidentified aircraft, later determined to be Flight 77, approaching Washington on their radar screens (see (Between 9:25 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), they initially think it is a military fighter plane, due to its high speed and the way it is being flown. [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Yet the alleged hijacker pilot of Flight 77 has been known for his poor flying skills. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/30/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002]

Aircraft Performs Elaborate Maneuver - The Dulles controllers are unable to identify the plane because its transponder—which transmits identifying information about an aircraft to radar screens—has been turned off (see 8:56 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001] It is flying at almost 500 miles per hour while approaching Washington, and then performs a rapid downward spiral, “dropping the last 7,000 feet in two and a half minutes,” before hitting the Pentagon (see 9:34 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CBS NEWS, 9/21/2001; USA TODAY, 8/12/2002]

Moving 'Like a Military Aircraft' - Controller Danielle O’Brien will later recall: “The speed, the maneuverability, the way that he turned, we all thought in the radar room, all of us experienced air traffic controllers, that that was a military plane. You don’t fly a 757 in that manner. It’s unsafe.” [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001] Another controller, Todd Lewis, will recall: “[N]obody knew that was a commercial flight at the time. Nobody knew that was American 77.… I thought it was a military flight. I thought that Langley [Air Force Base] had scrambled some fighters and maybe one of them got up there.… It was moving very fast, like a military aircraft might move at a low altitude.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

Alleged Pilot 'Could Not Fly at All' - Yet many people who have met Hani Hanjour, the hijacker allegedly at the controls of Flight 77, considered him to be a very poor pilot (see October 1996-December 1997, 1998, February 8-March 12, 2001, and (April-July 2001)). Just a month previously, an airport refused to rent him a single-engine Cessna plane because instructors there found his flying skills so weak (see Mid-August 2001). [GAZETTE (GREENBELT), 9/21/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001] And an employee at a flight school Hanjour attended earlier in the year will later comment: “I’m still to this day amazed that he could have flown into the Pentagon. He could not fly at all” (see January-February 2001). [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002]


Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Todd Lewis, Danielle O’Brien, Washington Dulles International Airport


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Finally Tells FAA Headquarters about Flight 77Edit event  

According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advises FAA headquarters that American 77 is lost in Indianapolis flight control’s airspace, that Indianapolis has no primary radar track, and is looking for the aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] When exactly the Command Center first learned that Flight 77 was lost is unclear. The earliest time reported by the 9/11 Commission is when an American Airlines employee mentioned it when calling the center at 9:16 a.m. (see 9:16 a.m.-9:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] American Airlines headquarters was notified of the loss of contact with Flight 77 before 9:00 a.m. (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), but had mistakenly thought this was the aircraft that hit the second WTC tower minutes later (see 9:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).


Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


(9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Take off, but Are Delayed during LaunchEdit event  

Captain Craig Borgstrom.

Captain Craig Borgstrom. [Source: US Air Force / Austin Knox]

The three F-16 fighter jets ordered to scramble from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) take off and, radar data will show, are airborne by 9:30 a.m. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4/16/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27]

Delayed during Launch - Major Dean Eckmann will recall that, after receiving the scramble order, he and the two other pilots have “a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, the three fighters are “given highest priority over all other air traffic at Langley Air Force Base” as they are launching. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] But, according to author Lynn Spencer, in spite of this, the jets are delayed. As Eckmann is approaching the runway, he calls the control tower for clearance to take off, but the tower controller tells him, “Hold for an air traffic delay.” Air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center “have not had time to clear airliners out of the way for the northerly heading. Dozens of aircraft at various altitudes fill the jets’ route.” After having to wait two minutes, Eckmann complains: “We’re an active air scramble. We need to go now!” Finally, the tower controller tells him, “Roger, Quit flight is cleared for takeoff, 090 for 60,” meaning the fighters are to fly due east for 60 miles (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Taking Off - The three jets launch 15 seconds apart, with Eckmann in front and the two other jets following. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 143-144] Pilot Craig Borgstrom will later recall, “[W]e took off, the three of us, and basically the formation we always brief on alert, we’ll stay in a two- to three-mile trail from the guy in front.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] According to the BBC, the pilots get a signal over their planes’ transponders, indicating an emergency wartime situation. [BBC, 9/1/2002]

Could Reach Washington before Pentagon Attack - F-16s have a maximum speed of 1,500 mph at high altitude, or 915 mph at sea level, so the three fighters could plausibly travel the 130 miles from Langley Air Force Base to Washington in just minutes. [CHANT, 1987, PP. 404; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/16/2000; USA TODAY, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001 pdf file; US AIR FORCE, 10/2007] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “I think if those aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, if we were operating under something other than peacetime rules, where they could have turned immediately toward Washington, DC, and gone into burner, it is physically possible that they could have gotten over Washington” before 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, the jets are redirected east over the Atlantic Ocean and will be 150 miles from the Pentagon when it is hit (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27]

Conflicting Times - Some early news reports after 9/11 will say the Langley jets take off at the later time of 9:35 a.m. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001] But according to Colonel Alan Scott, the former vice commander of the Continental US NORAD Region, though the jets are airborne at 9:30, the report of this does not come down until 9:35, so this fact may account for the conflicting times. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003]


Entity Tags: Brad Derrig, Alan Scott, Craig Borgstrom, Dean Eckmann, Langley Air Force Base, Larry Arnold


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93


(9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cheney Given Updates on Unidentified Flight 77 Heading toward Washington; Says ‘Orders Still Stand’; but Accounts Differ on Timing and Identity of the PlaneEdit event  

According to some accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House by this time, along with Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and others. Mineta will recall that, while a suspicious plane is heading toward Washington, an unidentified young man comes in and says to Cheney, “The plane is 50 miles out.” Mineta confers with acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, who is at the FAA’s Washington headquarters. Belger says to him: “We’re watching this target on the radar, but the transponder’s been turned off. So we have no identification.” According to Mineta, the young man continues updating the vice president, saying, “The plane is 30 miles out,” and when he gets down to “The plane is 10 miles out,” asks, “Do the orders still stand?” In response, Cheney “whipped his neck around and said, ‘Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?’” Mineta will say that, “just by the nature of all the events going on,” he infers that the order being referred to is a shootdown order. Nevertheless, Flight 77 continues on and hits the Pentagon. [BBC, 9/1/2002; ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim the plane heading toward Washington is only discovered by the Dulles Airport air traffic control tower at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). But earlier accounts, including statements made by the FAA and NORAD, will claim that the FAA notified the military about the suspected hijacking of Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., if not before (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FBI’s Washington Field Office was also reportedly notified that Flight 77 had been hijacked at about 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will further contradict Mineta’s account saying that, despite the “conflicting evidence as to when the vice president arrived in the shelter conference room [i.e., the PEOC],” it has concluded that he only arrived there at 9:58 a.m. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, the discussion between Cheney and the young aide over whether “the orders” still stand occurs later than claimed by Mineta, and is in response to Flight 93 heading toward Washington, not Flight 77. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002]


Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Monte Belger, Norman Mineta


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney


9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Autopilot on Flight 77 DisengagedEdit event  

Flight 77’s autopilot is disengaged. The plane is flying at 7,000 feet and is about 38 miles west of the Pentagon. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9] Information from the plane’s recovered flight data recorder (see September 13-14, 2001) later will indicate the pilot had entered autopilot instructions for a course to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (which is nearby the Pentagon). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004]


Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline


Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77


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1993 WTC Bombing (73)

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Mahmood Ahmed (30)

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2008 Kabul Indian Embassy Bombing (10)

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