31 August 2018
Addition
It is my belief that the Soviets always made their protests privately because they did not want to admit to their citizens that the United States could overfly them with impunity and that the government was powerless to do anything about it. This tactic suited us very well, as we did not want public exposure to produce an ultimatum for the Soviets that the world press would convert into a cause for war. What actually actually happened was that the two governments, even in their deep hostility, found it convenient to collaborate and keep the flights secret. (Bissell 113)
As soon as we had a few successful overflights, however, it did occur to me that, if you could demonstrate to an enemy country that you could overfly them with impunity and it couldn't do a goddamn thing to prevent you, that in itself would be a good deterrent. I believe this strongly, and it's a point that has never been made about the history of the U-2. The U-2 was a deterrent because it showed that the United States possessed a significant technological capability that the Soviets could not match. That was a great accomplishment. (Bissell 140)
........Addition
It is my belief that the Soviets always made their protests privately because they did not want to admit to their citizens that the United States could overfly them with impunity and that the government was powerless to do anything about it. This tactic suited us very well, as we did not want public exposure to produce an ultimatum for the Soviets that the world press would convert into a cause for war. What actually actually happened was that the two governments, even in their deep hostility, found it convenient to collaborate and keep the flights secret. (Bissell 113)
As soon as we had a few successful overflights, however, it did occur to me that, if you could demonstrate to an enemy country that you could overfly them with impunity and it couldn't do a goddamn thing to prevent you, that in itself would be a good deterrent. I believe this strongly, and it's a point that has never been made about the history of the U-2. The U-2 was a deterrent because it showed that the United States possessed a significant technological capability that the Soviets could not match. That was a great accomplishment. (Bissell 140)
Allen’s
approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did lose one, the pilot
would not survive…. We were told—and it was part of our understanding of the
situation—that it was almost certain that the plane would disintegrate and that
we could
take it as a certainty that no pilot would survive
... and that although they would know where the
plane came from,
it would be difficult to prove it in any convincing way. (Pedlow, and Welzenbach 97-98)
The photos from July overnights
were generally good, despite occasional problems caused by cloud cover. The
huge amount of film taken by these missions provided more information about the
Soviet Union's ability to track and intercept U-2s. Photo interpreters examining
the films eventually discovered the tiny images of MiG-l5s and MiG-17s beneath
the U-2s in various pursuit and attack attitudes: climbing, flipping over, and
falling toward Earth. It was even possible to determine their approximate altitudes.
These photographs showed that the Soviet air defense system was able w track U-2s well
enough to attempt interception, but they also provided proof that the fighter
aircraft available to the Soviet Union in 1956 could not bring down a U-2 at
operational altitude. (Pedlow, and Welzenbach 11)
The 4 and 5 July overflights
brought a strong protest from the Soviet Union on 10 July in the form of a note
handed to the US Embassy in Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a "twin-engine medium bomber of the
United States Air Force" and gave details of the routes flown by the
first two missions. The note did not mention Moscow or Leningrad,
however, because the Soviets had not been able to track these portions of the
overflights. The Soviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as
"intentional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence ... As soon as
the note arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956, Colonel Goodpaster called Bissell
and told him to stop all U-2 overflights until further notice. The next morning
Goodpaster met with Bissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three
additional flights had taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet
note but added that no more were planned. (Pedlow, and Welzenbach 35)
SOURCES:
1. Bissell, Richard M et al. Reflections Of A Cold Warrior. Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 113, 140.
2. Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach. "The Secret History Of The U-2 - And Area 51". Nsarchive.Gwu.Edu, 2018, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434/. Accessed 31 Aug 2018. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434/
3. Wise, David. "FRANCIS GARY POWERS IS ALIVE AND LIVING IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA". The Los Angeles Times Magazine, 1968, pp. 11-13.
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